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The Immigrant City
Rick Su*
Jurists, policymakers, and legal scholars often do not consider the issue of immigration from a
local perspective. As such, the intersection between immigration and local government law has
largely been neglected in the legal academic literature. Instead of subscribing to the
conventional belief that immigration and local governments are doctrinally distinct, this article
uncovers their latent intersection, explore how competing but often unexamined concerns about
local governments in legal doctrine conceal the mutual impact that immigration and local
government laws have upon one another, and use this analysis to explore how legal rules can be
changed to enhance the positive roles that local governments can play in our national
immigration project. If we tend to consider the issue of immigration from a purely federal
perspective, it is not solely because immigration implicates national interests that require the
institutional judgment of the federal government. Indeed, underlying the presumption of federal
exclusivity are also three competing models of the immigrant city that correspond with often
unexamined fears regarding the relationship between local governments and their immigrant
populations. Highlighting these concerns not only leads to a more nuanced understanding of
what underlies our bias against local participation with regard to immigration, but also allows
us to imagine alternative distribution of powers and responsibilities between federal and local
governments. I argue that by changing the incentive structure created by the legal rules
governing local governments, we can begin to reimagine our immigrant cities as being a
contribution rather than an obstacle to the substantive goals of our immigration project.
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Introduction
We do not typically think about immigration from a local perspective, although we inevitably
rely on our personal experiences with the local impacts of immigration to formulate our position
in the national discourse. We also do not ordinarily conceive of local governments as having a
role in immigration, although the prospects of our immigration policies often depend on how we
organize the cities and towns in which immigrants settle. For the most part, the doctrinal
analysis of both immigration and local government law has ascribed to the belief that no two
aspects of law can be more distinct from one another. Indeed, the recent debates over the role of
local governments in the enforcement of federal immigration laws highlight the widespread
discomfort over the merging of these two legal frameworks: critics of local enforcement decry
the adoption of a federal regulatory regime at the local level and its attendant costs on local
communities, while proponents of enforcement denounce local resistance as an unacceptable
intrusion of local prerogative into federal policy.1
If the doctrinal separation of immigration law and local government law is as entrenched as it is
ordinarily assumed to be, then any intersection between these two bodies of law can only be
understood as legal anomalies that should promptly be reconciled. To be sure, legal scholars
often do not recognize any connection between immigration and local government law at all.
Those who have identified areas of overlap, however, largely tailor their analysis towards
reifying the federalist division between what is local and what is national. The argument that the
site of this intersection may be a legal crossroad worthy of further research has thus far failed to
be fully considered.
This article attempts to offer such an analysis. Instead of ascribing to the conventional belief that
no connection exists between immigration and local government law, or employing legal
analysis to expediently mask the interplay between the two, this article sets out to do the
opposite. It begins with the premise that a largely unnoticed but exceptionally important
intersection already exists, argues that understanding this intersection exposes significant
insights about how immigration and local government law organize the lives and experiences of
immigrants and immigrant communities, and asserts that bringing this doctrinal intersection to
light uncovers the possibility of developing alternative ways to resolve many of the ongoing
debates in the immigration and local government discourse.
I refer to the site of this intersection as the immigrant city. In doing so, I am invoking not only
the legal rules that organize the geographically identifiable places in which immigrants live, but
also the legal doctrines that define the institutional role of our local governments and frame our
conceptualization of “community” in an era of immigration. Described as such, the immigrant
city is largely absent in the legal academic literature. Moreover, although judges and
policymakers create many of the legal intersections that I wish to explore, they largely do so
without a conscious or considered understanding of the immigrant cities they are creating.
The failure of legal scholars, jurists, and policymakers to explicitly recognize or adequately
explore the interplay between this nation’s immigration and local government laws is not just a
1

Compare, e.g., Ellen Barry, City Vents Anger at Illegal Immigrants, L.A. Times, July 14, 2006, at 1, with Juan A.
Lozano, Critics: Policy Makes Houston Haven for Immigrants, Houston Chron., July 31, 2006, a 1.
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doctrinal oversight; it has considerable consequences for both our nation’s immigration project
and the development of our local communities. On the one hand, the doctrinal separation of
these two fields conceals the fundamental impact that they have on one another. Immigration
scholars, who have thus far focused primarily on the desirability and consequences of our
nation’s immigration policy, overlook the tremendous influence that the organization of our local
spaces and the allocation of resources among communities have on this nation’s ability to
integrate foreign immigrants and its capacity to channel the effects of immigration to the benefit
of all its residents. Similarly, local government scholars seeking to achieve a more efficient,
equitable, and just allocation of municipal power and wealth neglect to account for the effect of
immigration laws on the kind of communities we foster, the prospects for decentralized power,
and workings of our local democratic institutions.
On the other hand, the legal divide between immigration and local government law hides the
extent to which this divergence is not only due to strong federal interest, but is also a byproduct
of implicit and often unexamined fears about the relationship between immigrants and local
communities. In this article, I identify three stylized models of the immigrant city in legal
doctrine: (1) the immigrant city as a threat to immigrants, (2) the immigrant city as a threat to the
nation and the states, and (3) the immigrant city as a victim of immigrants and national
immigration policy. I use these models to highlight the degree to which immigration law
influences and is influenced by the legal construction of the city, is based on concerns about
decentralized power, and affects our understanding of the institutional role of local governments
with respect to immigration. More importantly, I argue that although these models arise out of
competing concerns about the relationship between immigrants and cities, taken as a whole they
all advance a disempowered and depoliticized vision of the city while perpetuating an image of
immigrants as a federal population that is socially and politically outside of the local
communities within which they reside.
This article proceeds in four parts. The first two parts examine how the immigrant city is
currently represented. Part I focuses on the profound social, economic, and political impact of
immigration on the local level. It describes the countless numbers of foreign “aliens” who now
reside on our block as neighbors, work alongside us as colleagues, and may one day naturalize as
fellow citizens. In addition, it focuses on the local impacts that they have wrought — from the
social, economic, and physical revitalization to the fiscal and cultural pressures (and sometimes
vehement and violent backlashes).
Part II reveals that notwithstanding the developments outlined in Part I, the legal academic
literature has largely failed to recognize how immigration and local government law relate. To
be sure, there are extensive works in other academic disciplines looking at the condition of
immigrants in, and the impact of immigration on, our local spaces. Sociologists are studying the
residential housing patterns of immigrants,2 their position in local social and economic
networks,3 and their relationship with other racial and ethnic groups;4 economists are engaged in
2

See, e.g., Dowell Myers & Cathy Yang Liu, The Emerging Dominance of Immigrants in the US Housing Market
1970–2000, 23 Urban Policy and Research 347 (2005); Dowell Myers & Seong Woo Lee, Immigrant Trajectories
into Homeownership: A Temporal Analysis of Residential Assimilation, 32 Int’l Migration Rev. 593 (1998).
3
See, e.g., Roger Waldinger & Claudia Der-Martirosian, The Immigrant Niche: Pervasive, Persistant, Diverse, in
Strangers at the Gates : New Immigrants in Urban America (Roger Waldinger ed., 2001); Thomas Bailey &
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a vigorous debate over the role immigrants play in regional economies5 and their impact on the
fiscal health of local governments6; and urban theorists are exploring the fractured “translocal”
identities7 that have arisen in “world” and “global cities” as a result of transnational flows of
capital, culture, and people.8 Absent from this literature, however, is a rigorous examination of
the role that legal rules play in creating or perpetuating these developments. In short, scholars
who are studying immigrants and cities do not see the law, while scholars focused on the law
have demonstrated little awareness of the immigrant city.
In response to the gap identified in Part II, Part III analyzes various legal and political
developments in immigration and local government law to develop an analytical framework of
the immigrant city as a legal concept. I argue that underneath the presumption of federal
exclusivity with regard to immigration lies an undercurrent of fear about the relationship
between immigrants and local communities. Expanding upon the conventional federal account
of the doctrinal divergence between immigration and local government law, I will demonstrate
how various legal developments at the national, state, and local level support three models of the
immigrant city, each of which corresponds with different concerns about local involvement on
the issue of immigration. These three models, I contend, play a significant role in structuring
how we conceive of immigrants and the city in the national and local debates.
Part IV asks whether the immigrant city can be reimagined in a different light. It does so by
tackling the implicit concerns about the relationship between immigrants and local communities
discussed in Part III. If these concerns perpetuate the impression that local governments are illsuited to participate in the immigration project, then readjusting the legal rules to alleviate these
concerns might increase our acceptance of local involvement — especially with regard to
immigration issues that the federal government is currently unable or unwilling to address. The
choice, however, is not between local impotence and local autonomy; rather, depending on the
substantive goals we wish to pursue, cities can selectively empowered, disempowered, and
incentivized to play a meaningful role in the immigration project. To foreground the immigrant
city, therefore, is to bring these possibilities to light. Part IV will be followed by a brief
conclusion.
I hope in this article to expose the legal doctrinal influence of immigration and local government
law on our current understanding of the immigrant city and open the door for alternative
conceptualizations. Although this article may be one of the first to address this specific topic, it
is not intended to be the last. Indeed, I hope to motivate others in the legal academy to engage in
Roger Waldinger, Primary, Secondary, and Enclave Labor Markets : A Training Systems Approach, 56 American
Sociological Review 432 (1991).
4
See generally Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles (Lawrence D. Bobo et al. eds., 2000); Nelson
Lim, On the Back of Blacks?: Immigrants and the Fortunes of African Americans, in Strangers at the Gates, supra
note 3, at 186.
5
Compare George J. Borjas, Heaven’s Gate (1999), with Julian L Simon, The Economic Consequences of
Immigration (2d ed. 1999) and David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?, 115 The Econ. J. F300
(2005).
6
See Debroah L. Garvey et al., Are Immigrants a Drain on the Public Fisc?: State and Local Impacts in New Jersey,
Soc. Sci. Q. 537 (2002).
7
See e.g., Michael Peter Smith, Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization 169 - 72 (2000)
8
See generally John Friedmann, The World City Hypothesis (1986); Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New
York, London, Tokyo (1991).
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a considered and conscious discussion of this issue as well. The immigrant city is far too
important an institution to be left on the sidelines of our immigration and local government
debates. The time has come for us to take a serious look at its legal structure and its effects on
American society.
I. The Local Impact of Immigration
The history of the American city is intimately related to the history of immigration. Just as
America is often described as a country of immigrants, it follows that America can also be
described as a country of immigrant cities. Since the beginning of America’s urbanization,
almost all of the major metropolitan regions that now serve as this country’s economic and
cultural foundation have been built upon the ready supply of immigrant labor and molded by the
social fabric of immigrant communities. Therefore, in order to understand the legal significance
of the immigrant city, we must therefore begin with an analysis of the ways in which
immigration is changing the demographic, economic, and political character of our local
communities.
A. Demographics
We are now experiencing America’s second great wave of immigration. Not since the turn of
the 20th century has a larger percentage of immigrants relative to the native population landed on
America’s shores and poured into its cities. In contrast to the 500,000 or so immigrants who
arrived in the 1930s, more than 9 million immigrants came between 1991 and 2000. At 11.7
percent of the U.S. population in 2003,9 the foreign-born population of over 31 million is slowly
approaching the 14.8 percent peak set in the 1890s.10
These statistics are telling. But they fail to capture “one central feature of the immigration
process: immigrants are geographically concentrated in their host countries.”11 In other words,
the aggregate national statistics that dominate much of the immigration debate do not always
reflect the actual living conditions of immigrants or the specific manner in which they interact
with American society.
Indeed, not unlike historic patterns of immigrant settlement, almost all immigrants today live in
established metropolitan regions rather than the rural fringe.12 Moreover, immigrants are not
evenly distributed. Currently, five metropolitan regions (Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco
Chicago, and Miami) are home to more than half of America’s foreign born-population.13 This
concentration has radically transformed the demographic make-up of these areas. For example,
immigrants and their children constitute almost two-thirds of Miami’s, “more than half of
9

U.S. Census Bureau, The Foreign-Born Population in the United States, at 1 (August 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-551.pdf.
10
Campbell J. Gibson & Kay Jung, U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born
Population of the United States: 1850 to 2000, at 1 (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.pdf.
11
Jeannette Money, Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control 43 (1999).
12
See The Foreign-Born Population in the United States, supra note 9, at 2.
13
See Roger Waldinger & Jennifer Lee, New Immigrant in Urban America, in Strangers at the Gate, supra note 3,
at 30, 43.
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metropolitan Los Angeles’s . . ., just under half of metro San Francisco’s . . . , and two fifths of
metropolitan New York’s” total population.14
In addition to these cities, new immigrant “gateways” are also beginning to take shape.15 Indeed,
for the last few decades, immigrants have been leaving or bypassing traditional gateways for
non-traditional destinations.16 From 1980 to 2000, the metropolitan regions of Atlanta, Raleigh,
and Las Vegas experienced some of the largest percentage increases of foreign-born residents in
the entire country — 817%, 709%, and 637%, respectively.17 Immigrants are also increasingly
moving to the suburbs: at the turn of the twenty-first century, the percentage of immigrants living
in the suburbs surpassed those living in the central cities.18
Because of the racial and ethnic diversity of the most recent wave of immigration, this process
has dramatically altered the demographic composition of various communities. For instance, the
Los Angeles suburb of Compton — engrained in our collective cultural imagination as a
quintessential black “ghetto” — has in recent years, and with substantial controversy, become a
majority-Hispanic city.19 In addition, Los Angeles County, which was overwhelmingly Anglo in
the 1970s (70%),20 has since become a majority-minority region with Anglos accounting for less
than 30% of the county’s residents.21 As a result, the traditional image of white suburbs ringing
an urban core of racial and ethnic minorities has been replaced by “islands” of Anglo enclaves
“surrounded by vast ethnic or transitional communities.”22
B. Municipal Health
How has immigration affected the local communities in which they reside? For most
communities, particularly major metropolitan centers, the effect has been positive. Indeed, many
now believe that urban revitalization of the latter half of the twentieth century is due in large part
to the liberalization of the federal immigration restrictions in 1965. As Paul Grogan and Tony
Proscio explained, “[t]here is almost no question, in any case, about whether immigration is good
for cities, or about whether many inner-city markets will reach their full potential without it.”23
14

John Mollenkopf, et al., Immigrant Political Participation in New York and Los Angeles, in Governing
American Cities 17, 19 (Michael Jones-Correa ed., 2001).
15
See U.S. Census Bureau, Migration of Natives and the Foreign Born: 1995 to 2000, at 4 (August 2003), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-11.pdf.
16
See id. at 4 – 9; see also William Frey, Diversity Spreads Out: Metropolitan Shifts in Hispanic, Asian, and Black
Populations Since 2000, Living Cities Census Series (Brookings Institution), Mar. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.brook.edu/metro/pubs/20060307_Frey.pdf.
17
See Audrey Singer, The Rise of New Immigrant Gateways, Living Cities Census Series (Brookings
Institution), Feb. 2004, at 21, available at http://www.brookings.edu/urban/pubs/20040301_gateways.pdf.
18
See id. at 10.
19
See generally Albert M. Camarillo, Black and Brown in Compton: Demographic Change and Ethnic/Race
Relations in a South Central Los Angeles Community, 1950-2000, in Not Just Black and White (Nancy Foner et
al. eds., 2004).
20
See Edward W. Soja, Introduction to Los Angeles, in The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of
the Twentieth Century 14 (Allen J. Scott et al. eds., 1996)
21
U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts for Los Angeles County, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html
22
Dale Maharidge, The Coming White Minority 10 (1996).
23
Paul S. Grogan & Tony Proscio, Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood Revival 139
(2000).
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Echoing this sentiment, Thomas Muller deemed it “safe to say . . . that immigration by itself has
sparked more neighborhood revitalization and commercial activity than even the most successful
case of government intervention . . . Had immigration to central cities been a federal urban aid
program, it would be rated among the most successful and cost-effective approaches for
invigorating the urban core.”24
To explain these positive effects, commentators have noted how immigrants fill various
economic gaps and gravitate toward self-employment and entrepreneurship.25 Studies show that
various niches in urban economies, from low-skilled labor such as those in the garment
industry26 to high-skilled occupations in urban hospitals,27 are disproportionately staffed by
immigrants. Moreover, the human and social capital of foreign immigrants has helped many
cities become critical nodes in the global exchange of capital, culture, and information —what
urban scholars now refer to as “World” or “Global Cities.” Indeed, it is no coincidence that the
City of Miami, which supports a large immigrant population from Central and South America,
has emerged in recent years as America’s gateway to Latin America28 in the same way that Los
Angeles is now widely seen as the gateway to the Pacific Rim.29
It is worth noting, however, that much of the positive local impact of immigration is due to their
presence. The drastic decline of many urban cores and inner-ring suburbs during the mid-1900s
was caused in large part by massive suburbanization and urban depopulation. This, in turn, led
to a decline in the value of residential property and a corresponding fall in the municipal tax
base. As a result, many residential and commercial properties were abandoned, while the
declining tax base forced cities to raise taxes and lower the level and quality of municipal
services. The inflow of immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s played a large role in stemming and,
in some cities, reversing this decline.30 Anecdotes abound of neighborhoods that have gone from
being blocks of abandoned buildings to those supporting vibrant immigrant communities.31
Moreover, a study conducted during the 1990s found that on almost all economic and social
indicators of municipal health — population growth, job creation, unemployment, per capita
income, poverty, crime, and tax rate — “cities with large foreign-born populations fare better
than cities with few immigrants.”32
24

Thomas Muller, Immigrants and the American City 304 (1993).
See generally Roger Walding, et al., Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Businesses in Industrial Societies
(1990).
26
See Ivan Light et al., Immigration Incorporation in the Garment Industry of Los Angeles, 33 Int’l Migration Rev.
5, 12 – 13 (1999).
27
See Loius Winnick, New People in Old Neighborhoods 42 (1990); Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal
Aliens and the Making of Modern America 262 (2003).
28
See Jan Nijman, Globalization to a Latin Beat: The Miami Growth Machine, 551 The Annals Am. Acad. Pol. &
Soc. Sci. 164, 166 – 67 (1997); Saskia Sassesn & Alejadro Portes, Miami: A New Global City?, 22 Contemp. Soc.
471, 472 - 72 (1993).
29
See Franklin J. James, et al., The Effect of Immigration on Urban Communities, 3 Cityscape 171, 182 – 83
(1998).
30
See Muller, supra note 24, at 116 – 17; Winnick, supra note 27, at 11.
31
See, e.g., Joel Millman, The Other Americans 80 (1997); Robert L. Smith, Chinese Immigrants Reshape
Neighborhood in Growing Numbers, Families Build a Community in Cleveland, The Plain Dealer, July 23, 2001,
at A1.
32
Stephen Moore, Hoover Institute, Immigration and the Rise and Decline of American Cities 29 (1997). The
report was careful to note the data “does not prove that immigrants cause cities’ economic prosperity,” but simply
“challenges the conventional belief that immigration is a leading cause of urban decline.” Id. at 4.
25
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If immigration has helped to revitalize struggling, depopulated communities, the research on its
fiscal costs to local government presents a more complicated story. The conventional belief is
that although immigrants pay more in taxes to the federal government than they receive in
federally-funded services, on average, they cost local governments more than they contribute to
local coffers.33 Of course, these findings should be understood in context. First, it is generally
agreed that immigrants do not pose a higher burden on local services or pay fewer taxes than
similarly-situated native residents.34 Second, most municipal services are consumed collectively;
even if local tax revenues collected from immigrants do not completely defray the cost of these
services, often the economic burden borne by local governments would not be reduced
proportionately if fewer immigrants were to arrive.35 Moreover, studies on the tax burden of
immigrants on local governments often fail to account for the fact that very few cities actually
cover all their expenditures with local tax receipts; a large part of most urban municipal budgets,
regardless of the size of their immigrant population, is made up of state and federal grants.36
C. Local Reactions
Municipal issues over which local governments have traditionally exercised the most control —
education, policing, the provision of local services, and spatial planning and zoning — are now
being complicated by the unique needs and differing interests of immigrants and immigrant
communities. How have local governments reacted to these changes?
So far, it appears that most local government officials are not proactively addressing these issues.
A recent study on local governments in California found that, with the exception of cities
characterized by exceptionally large immigrant populations and a strong presence of immigrantadvocacy groups, communications between immigrants and local governments are usually quite
limited.37 Most local government officials in cities with significant and/or growing immigrant
populations ranked immigrants and ethnic organizations near the bottom of their list with regard
to their influence on local policies, especially with regard to housing.38 Ironically, although
immigrants generally express a lack of trust for local police, local police officials demonstrated
33

One literature review found that on average immigrant household costs local governments $1,638 in services and
generates only $1,172 in revenues. See James, et al, supra note 29, at 185.
34
See, e.g., Michael Fix & Jeffrey Passel, Urban Institute, Trends in Noncitizens’ and Citizens’ Use of Public
Benefits Following Welfare Reform: 1994-97 (March 1999) (finding that when controlling for poverty and/or the
presence of children, welfare use among noncitizens were lower than citizens before and significantly more so after
the 1996 welfare reforms); Sarita A. Mohanty, Unequal Access: Immigrants and U.S. Health Care, Immigration
Pol’y in Focus, July 2006, at 1, 3 – 4 (finding that per capita health care expenditures were 55% lower for
immigrants than natives in 1998 (including emergency room visits paid for by local governments) and that on
average immigrant children receive 77% less than native children), available at
http://www.ailf.org/ipc/infocus/unequal_access.pdf. But see Borjas, supra note 5, at 113 (arguing that it matters not
that “immigrant households headed by high school dropouts do not use welfare any more often than native
households headed by high school dropouts — especially if high school dropouts dominate the immigrant
population.”).
35
See James et al., supra note 29, at 184.
36
See, e.g., Michael Jones-Correa, Structural Shifts and Institutional Capacity: Possibilities for Ethnic Cooperation
and Conflict in Urban Settings, in Governing American Cities, supra note 14, at 183, 191 – 194.
37
S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Paul G. Lewis, Public Policy Institute of California, Immigrants and Local
Governance: The View from City Hall 33 – 34, 37 - 38 (2005)
38
See id. at 49.
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the highest awareness of immigrant needs and expressed the strongest interest in reaching out to
establish tangible relationships with their communities.39
This is not to say that some localities, especially suburban communities with little experience
dealing with immigrants, have not reacted passionately to growing influx of immigrants. There
are numerous accounts of community agitation with local immigrant populations — often
focusing on the most visible aspects such as day-laborers and residential overcrowding. In doing
so, local communities are increasingly trying to extend their control into the private sphere40
while seeking to close off and regulate traditionally public spaces as well.41
II. The Immigrant and the City in Contemporary Legal Scholarship
But if immigration has and continues to be a significant influence on the development of our
local communities, both immigration and local government scholars have largely ignored the
connection. In the cities described by local government scholars, one would be hard-pressed to
find any signs of immigrants. Of the immigrants described by immigration law scholars, one
would assume that they had no relationship with any governmental institution other than the
nation-state.
To be sure, neither the “immigrant” nor the “city” is entirely absent from the local government or
immigration law literature respectively. As this Part shows, local government scholars do
sometimes acknowledge immigrants just as immigration scholars occasionally note cities. The
focus of this article, however, is not just the immigrant or the city as descriptive labels, but also
the immigrant and the city as legal concepts. From this perspective, the gap is even more
glaring. It is not simply that the immigrant and the city are not discussed together in a
comprehensive manner. Rather, the manner in which they are represented in the literature often
obscures the connection between the two from a legal perspective.
This Part explores how academic accounts offer an incomplete picture of the legal role of the
immigrant city in both local government and immigration law. So far, the representation of the
immigrant in the local government literature focuses predominately on the racial, ethnic, or
socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants or their preference for specific local services. In
doing so, the local government literature has largely ignored the fact that the immigrant identity,
and the rights, obligations, and societal roles that flow from that identity, is structured and
constructed by the federal laws concerning immigration and naturalization. At the same time,
the immigration literature recognizes the city as a geographic place within which immigrants
concentrate and a governmental entity that provides public services to immigrants. But in both
of these portrayals, the city is either represented as an institution that is synonymous with the
39

See id. at 75 – 76.
See Stephanie McCrummen, Manassas Changes Definition Of Family: Activists Criticize New Housing Limits As
Anti-Immigrant, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 2005, at A1. This local ordinance was later repeated. See Stephanie
McCrummen, Anti-Crowding Law Repealed: Latinos Were Focus of Manassas Ban on Extended Families in
Homes, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 2006, at A1.
41
See Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angles v. Burke, No. CV 98-4863-GHK, 2000 WL 1481467,
at *1, *13 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 12, 2000) (striking down a Los Angeles County Ordinance that prohibited day-laborers
from soliciting work on the street for violating the First and Fourteenth Amendment).
40

10

Draft: September 4, 2006

state and therefore lacking an independent legal status, or simply a geographic space without a
legal or political identity at all. I argue that the tendency of immigration and local government
scholars to rely on legally-neutral categories explains why the legal construction of the
immigrant city has largely gone unnoticed.
A. The Immigrant in Local Government Law
1. The Immigrant as Racial, Ethnic, or Socioeconomic Minorities
America’s metropolitan regions are “now divided into districts that are so different from each
other they seem to be different worlds”42 Thus, a central aim of local government scholars has
been to excavate and explain the extent to which local government laws create and maintain such
divisions. Eschewing the conventional belief that the structure of our local communities can be
wholly explained by individual preferences or neutral market dynamics, local government
scholars have focused on how legal rules empower certain communities and skew market
incentives to favor racial and socioeconomic segregation. It is no surprise then that this focus
serves as one of the primary frameworks for discussing immigrants in the local government
context: local government scholars often invoke immigrants as, and therefore interchangeable
with, racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic minorities.
For some scholars, this manner of discussing immigrants is rooted in history. Immigrants are
often described in the local government literature as undesirable populations in the inner cities
from which well-to-do residents sought escape through suburbanization. Therefore, for scholars
like Professor Briffault, the influx of poor immigrants into the urban core, their ability to secure
political power therein, and the association of the city with “foreigners, crime, vice and political
corruption,” explains the reason why the “older stock of Americans living in the outlying areas”
began to resist annexation in favor of maintaining political autonomy.43 Representing
immigrants in this manner, Briffault quickly incorporates his brief discussion of immigrants into
the broader and more conventional analysis of the role of local government law in perpetuating
racial and ethnic segregation.44 At the same time, the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic account
of immigrants is used to explain the contemporary organization of our metropolitan regions as
well. For example, in describing the portrayal of Los Angeles as “Capital of the Third World,”
Professor Frug’s focus was not so much on immigrants per se, but on how it “symboliz[es]” the
fact that “issues of ethnicity, race, and class cross-cut America's metropolitan areas without
stopping at jurisdictional borders.”45
To be sure, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status are important components of the
immigration debate. The problem with this representation, however, is that immigrants are
legally burdened in ways that most racial and socioeconomic minorities are not. Unlike native
minorities, the marginalization of immigrants is ideologically and legally supported by the fact
that they are construed by the law as outside of our political community. Indeed, not only do our
immigration and naturalization laws permit discrimination in ways that would not be acceptable
42
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for American citizens, but the powerful rationale that supports this legal position justifies their
marginality in social and economic contexts as well.
2. The Immigrant as a Proxy for Market Preferences
The second approach of local government scholars is to account for immigrant status as a proxy
for a particular set of preferences for municipal services or community character. Instead of
focusing on the reactions of natives to immigrants, this account focuses on the type of
communities that they prefer.
The work of Professor Gillette is an example of this approach. He touches upon the issue of
immigration by identifying how immigrants may possess a set of preferences different from
those of native residents, which in turn affects how a community may seek to structure their
services in order to either attract or deter them. He notes that even if a locality would stand to
benefit from an influx of immigrants into the region, it may be inclined to free ride by not
providing immigrant services and imposing those costs upon other communities, if any, that do.46
To be sure, Gillette employs this model as an example of how background legal rules affect the
willingness of localities to undertake or subsidize activities to the benefit of themselves and the
region. Nevertheless, the understanding of immigrants underlying this account focuses primarily
on immigrant status as a proxy for certain set of preferences.
Accounting for immigrants in this manner conforms to two broad generalizations about the
relationship between immigrants and local communities. The first is that the residential choice
of immigrants is predominately guided by their preferences. Thus immigrant communities are
portrayed as alternative economic and social marketplaces within which immigrants have
opportunities for upward mobility in similar ways as natives in the mainstream economy.47 This
view leads naturally to another commonly held belief in the local government literature: that
local communities can be understood as a package of goods and services that potential residents
select, much like a consumer would in a traditional marketplace. Corresponding with Tiebout’s
market conceptualization of local communities, immigrant communities are perceived as another
example of a voluntary association established by the rational and efficient workings of the
marketplace of communities.48
Again, this account explains much of the local dynamics that produce immigrant communities.
Nevertheless, focusing too much on the immigrant communities as a product of rational choice
obscures the manner by which these communities, or at least the incentive structure that leads
immigrants to favor them, is influenced by background legal rules. It ignores the fact, as Robert
Park noted at the turn of the twentieth century, “that if the immigrant lives in a colony of his own
people it is because, under ordinary circumstances, that is the only place he can live at all”;49 or
46

Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J. L. & Pol. 365, 386 - 87 (2005).
See, e.g., Richard Alba & Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and
Contemporary Immigration 164 (2003); Kenneth L. Wilson & Alejadro Portes, Immigrant Enclaves: An Analysis
of the Labor Market Conditions of Cubans in Miami, 86 American J. of Sociology 295, 315 (1980).
48
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 418 - 20 (1956); see also Gerald E.
Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 26 – 28 (1998) (describing the prevalence of Tiebout’s argument in the
local government literature).
49
Robert E. Park, The Collected Papers of Robert Ezra Park __ (1974).
47

12

Draft: September 4, 2006

as Professors Frug and Barron recently noted, immigrant preferences are necessarily confined by
the type of communities that the existing local government structure encourages and permits.50
Moreover, as social scientists have discovered, although immigrant communities provide
benefits to recent immigrants, they can also have a restrictive dark side. There is a growing
awareness that the cultural and economic niches that these communities produce also work as
socioeconomic traps for many of its members.51
In addition, the market-actor view of immigrants and immigrant communities neglects the fact
that immigration laws also play a role in encouraging or perpetuating enclave development.
Immigration law’s family reunification policy and financial sponsorship requirement encourage
concentrated living patterns in which the enforced legal dependency is easier to satisfy. It also
strengthens the reliance of immigrants on enclave labor markets. Because most employers in the
mainstream labor market, especially those in the low-wage sectors, are unwilling to provide the
support or assurances required for the sponsorship of new immigrants, existing immigrants can
often only rely on co-ethnic employers in the enclave labor market for such needs, which further
strengthens the hold of ethnic employers on immigrant laborers.52
3. The Normative Outlook of Local Government Law
It may be that the local government literature’s failure to treat the immigrant as a legal concept is
largely a result of the doctrinal divergence between immigration and local government law.
However, it may also be that addressing immigrants from a non-legal perspective serves to
preserve the normative framework that dominates much of the local government literature — one
that focuses on the commonality of citizenship in advancing reform.
Most local government scholars start from the position that the current structure of local
government law perpetuates troubling inter-local inequities and undesirable residential
segregation. Underlying this conviction is the belief that notwithstanding the significant role that
local boundaries play in dividing the residents of the metropolitan landscape, a meta-framework
exists through which one can make an appeal to mutual obligation. It is therefore no surprise
that most of the solutions that are proposed in the local government literature rest upon the
assumption that a broader communal identity exists to bind the fates of all residents together. In
their attempt to buttress their normative project, local government scholars often invoke the idea
of “citizenship” (presumably national or state) in order to draw upon the mutual obligations that
residents of different communities have toward one another in order to challenge the inequities
that municipal boundaries often serve to perpetuate.53 Indeed, if no such overarching framework
exists to capture the legal and political interconnection between residents of one municipality to
50
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another, many of the redistributive prescriptions local government scholars propose would lack
much of their normative force.54
Take, for example, the reformative proposals of Professor Schragger. Like many local
government scholars, Schragger deconstructs the concept of “community” by revealing the
extent to which it is constructed by exclusionary and boundary-maintaining norms. Seeking an
alternative, Schragger finds guidance in Saenz v. Roe,55 a Supreme Court decision striking down
a California statute limiting the welfare benefits of new residents who had just moved from
another state.56
Schragger’s invocation of Saenz is fitting in the local government context because the Supreme
Court’s commitment to inter-state mobility in this case contrasts sharply with its tolerance of
barriers to inter-municipal mobility in cases like Warth v. Seldon. As Schragger aptly notes,
“[w]hat is quite stunning [about Saenz] is the radical disjuncture between Saenz's rigorous attack
on a statute that would make it marginally less attractive for poor residents from other states to
move to California and Warth's equally rigorous defense of an exclusionary zoning regime that
makes it virtually impossible for poor residents from a nearby town to move into [the wealthy
community of] Penfield.”57
Nevertheless, what makes the bold language in Saenz useful as a counterpoint to exclusionary
zoning cases like Warth is its reliance on a strong communitarian conceptualization of
citizenship through its invocation of the long-neglected Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens explained that such a right to inter-state mobility “is
protected not only by the new arrival's status as a state citizen, but also by her status as a citizen
of the United States”; it is the recognition that a “citizen of the United States has a perfect
constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein,
and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole power of the nation is pledged to
sustain him in that right.”58
But if Saenz’s “construction of a national citizenship through the wholly unanticipated rebirth of
the privileges or immunities clause” gives doctrinal support to challenges against exclusionary
practices by suburban enclaves on the local level, it “also illustrates the perils of the citizenship
project [by] appear[ing] to draw an indelible line between the rights of citizens and aliens.”59
Immigrants, whose claim to any such overarching community are weakened by the fact that they
are legally and morally understood to be outside of the national polity, threaten the normative
thrust of most local government scholarship. Indeed, it is almost uniformly assumed that our
nation’s obligation to noncitizen immigrants is fundamentally different from those, minority or
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otherwise, who have formal membership in our national community.60 Thus, although
mobilizing a strong conceptualization of citizenship offers ways to dismantle the pervasive local
insularity that has contributed to the vast disparity between prosperous and disadvantaged local
jurisdictions, it also poses the risk of excluding noncitizen immigrants from the progressive
project.
B. The City in Immigration Law
1. The Myth of Unimpeded Internal Migration
Given the almost exclusive focus on the nation-state as the only relevant legal institution in the
immigration discourse, it is no surprise that most accounts of the city treat it simply as a
geographic place where immigrants live. That cities are also political and legal entities often
escapes notice. Even more interesting, however, is the non-legal manner in which the city is
portrayed in the normative theoretical debate over immigration restrictions. Indeed, in this
debate, the immigration literature has managed to create and perpetuate a puzzling myth: that in
opposition to transnational migration, internal migration in liberal democratic nations such as the
United States is largely unrestricted.
Consider, for instance, the foundation of Michael Walzer’s theoretical justification for a nationstate’s right to regulate transnational migration.61 Like other scholars who have wrestled with
the concept of a national community,62 Walzer admits early on that “few of us have any direct
experience of what a country is or what it means to be a member . . . we understand it best when
we compare it to other, smaller associations whose compass we can more easily grasp,” such as
the “neighborhood.”63
Nevertheless, although Walzer invokes the neighborhood, his account largely overlooks consider
the complex legal regime that regulates how neighborhoods are constructed and maintained. As
Walzer asserts, the neighborhood is a place without any formal admissions criteria and as such,
can be understood as a “random association, ‘not a selection, but rather a specimen of life as a
whole.’”64 To be fair, Walzer admits that while “strangers” cannot be formally admitted or
excluded, they can be welcomed or not welcomed. Moreover, he briefly notes the role of
municipal zoning in maintaining class segregation. Nevertheless, he posits that as a formal
matter, neighborhoods are essentially open institutions that present no significant obstacle to
inter-local mobility.65
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Construing the neighborhood in this manner, Walzer’s defense of a state’s ability to restrict,
control, and regulate immigration essentially becomes a defense of his vision of localism.
Rejecting claims that unimpeded immigration limits the development of the “patriotic
sentiments” that make communal cohesion possible, Walzer contends that open borders would
actually lead to the opposite — an intense and undesirable surge in localist sentiment and
regional fragmentation. As he explains:
Neighborhoods can be open only if countries are at least potentially closed. Only if states
make a selection among would-be members and guarantee the loyalty, security, and
welfare of the individuals it selects, can local communities take shape as ‘indifferent’
associations determined solely by personal preference and market capacity. . . . To tear
down the walls of the state is not . . . to create a world without walls, but rather to create a
thousand petty fortresses.66
In this defense of localism, however, Walzer’s argument actually oscillates between two
competing visions of local communities. On the one hand, local communities are worth
protecting because they are a legally unrestricted aggregation of strangers. On the other hand,
the fear that open borders on a national level will result in “a thousand petty fortresses” suggest
that local communities are already empowered with the legal authority to exclude “undesirable”
residents. Yet the foundation for Walzer’s claim that neighborhoods are worth protecting is
because they are not entitled to restrict entry through legal mechanisms.
Walzer does not wrestle with the latent contradictions in his theoretical model. Indeed, one can
argue that through the use of particular labels, Walzer avoids this legal conflict altogether: he
uses “neighborhood” — a geographic space that lacks any positive legal identity — when
referring to what needs to be protected and only switches to talking about “cities” when
discussing the dangers of internal fragmentation.67 Therefore, even while using local
communities as an analytical model for understanding national immigration policy, Walzer and
others in the normative immigration literature continue to reify the invisibility of the city as a
legal concept by continuing to overlook the role that local government law plays in forming and
organizing such communities.
2. Immigration Federalism and the Conflation of State and Local Governments
For some immigration scholars, there is the growing recognition that the “local” is more than just
a geographic place. Rather, under a broad field of inquiry known as “immigration federalism,”
these scholars recognize that local communities are legal and political institutions and have
begun to examine policies instituted by state and local government that affect the lives of
immigrants.
The legal inquiry into the role of state and local governments under the rubric of immigration
federalism arose predominantly in response to two major legal developments, both of which
occurred in 1996. The first was the passage of the Welfare Reform Act, which rendered legal
66
67
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immigrants without citizenship ineligible for several federal benefit programs68 and authorized
the state to provide or deny state benefits to noncitizen immigrants.69 The second was the
passage of the 1996 Immigration Reform Act, which authorized, but did not require, state and
local governments to enter into cooperative arrangements with the federal government to enforce
federal immigration laws70 while, at the same time, invalidating local government policies that
prohibit employees from cooperating with federal immigration officials.71
Because contemporary immigration scholars perceive the increasing role of state and local
governments as a radical departure from traditional immigration jurisprudence, the articles in this
field have predominately focused on the legality and desirability of devolving the federal
government’s immigration powers.72 Nevertheless, although the recent scholarship on
immigration federalism has pushed immigration scholars to consider state and local governments
in immigration matters, these inquiries have yet to fully consider the body of local government
law.
Indeed, it appears that most immigration scholars continue to conflate state and local
governments without acknowledging the unique role of local governments relative to the state.
This is slightly surprising because one of the legal developments that prompted this course of
inquiry — the 1996 reform to the Immigration Act that allowed local entities to enter into
cooperative contractual agreements with the federal government to enforce federal immigration
laws — specifically recognizes the separate and possibly divergent interest of state and local
entities. The provision allowed local institutions to negotiate and contract directly with the
federal government irrespective of the views of the state within which it is located. For example,
whereas neither the State of California nor the City of Los Angeles have seen fit to enter into
such an agreement with federal immigration authorities, the County of Los Angeles agreed to a
cooperative arrangement and independently negotiated the specific terms its enforcement would
entail.73 That local institutions may act independent from, and possibly in contrast with, the
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policy aims of the state as a whole have not been fully explored in the literature on immigration
federalism.
3. The Normative Outlook of Immigration Law
I have argued that the failure of the local government literature to consider the legal construction
of immigrants might be explained by the normative outlook of most local government scholars.
In many ways, the corresponding absence of the city as a legal concept in the immigration
literature could be understood this way as well.
So far, the most important issue in the immigration scholarship appears to be the difference
between the legal status of noncitizen immigrants and naturalized or native citizens. Thus, the
normative push of most immigration scholars relies on anti-discrimination grounds. Even while
some have noted the decreasing significance of citizenship,74 immigration scholars increasingly
contend that the distinction between citizens and aliens should matter less in setting the social
and economic rights of immigrants who reside within the nation.75 Therefore, it can be argued
that the tendency of most immigration scholars to neglect the relevance of local political
boundaries or fail to distinguish the legal and political construction of local communities from
that of the state is attributed to the fact that these distinctions do not directly factor into the fault
lines that motivate the antidiscrimination push of this field of scholarship.
But municipal boundaries and local residency matter. Contrary to the myth that intra-national
migration is unhindered, the existing structure of local government law plays a role in
determining who lives where and the consequences of local residency. So, just as immigration
scholars fixate on the uneven allocation of economic resources and opportunity across the globe
in assessing the moral basis for immigration controls, the organization of our local spaces
necessarily defines the future impact that contemporary immigration will ultimately have. Even
in the immigration federalism debates, the consequences of residing in one locality as opposed to
another makes a significant difference, especially with the increasing devolution of public
services down to the local level. It means very little if states decide to provide certain services or
benefits, such as education, to immigrant populations if they also allocate primary responsibility
for those services to local governments. Whether one locality can or will provide such services
ultimately hinges on the legal framework that allocates the state’s resources among the
communities themselves.
III. The Immigrant City as a Legal Concept
To understand and transcend both the invisibility of the immigrant city in the legal academic
literature and the wide-spread belief that local communities have very little to do with
immigration, we must examine the latent intersections between immigration and local
government law in legal doctrine. We must consider not only how the development of
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immigration law has excluded the city, but also identify the legal conceptualizations of the city
that have both led to and are a result of this exclusion.
To demonstrate this requires us to push beyond the legal presumption that immigration is a
purely federal issue. Thus, in Part III.A., I begin with a critical reexamination of this
presumption. I find that the conventional account of federal exclusivity relies upon not only the
doctrinal federalization of immigration law, but also the conceptual federalization of the
immigrant population. Nevertheless, by focusing almost entirely on federal government’s
interest over immigration in describing the need for federal exclusivity, this account ignores how
legal constructions of the “local” also play a large role in advancing the doctrinal exclusion of
local governments from the immigration project.
Indeed, as I argue in Part III.B., immigration is now understood as a purely federal issue not only
because of the strong federal interests, but also because of largely unexamined fears harbored by
judges and policymakers at the federal, state, and even local level over the relationship between
immigrants and local communities. In support of this, I identify three stylized models of the
immigrant city, each of which corresponds with different and competing fears of the “local” in
the immigration context: (1) the immigrant city as a threat to immigrants, (2) the immigrant city
as a threat to the nation and the states, and (3) the immigrant city as a victim of immigration and
national immigration policy. These models illustrate the conflicting anxieties about localism
underlying the presumption of federal exclusivity. In other words, we have a hard time
imagining how local governments can play a role with regard to immigration because, at a
fundamental level, we do not trust the institutional capacity of local governments to do so
without either trouncing upon the rights of immigrants, undermining the interest of the nation or
the state, or being entirely overwhelmed by immigrants and immigration policy.
Uncovering the influence of these fears on the doctrinal divergence of immigration and local
government law also allows us to entertain ways in which the immigrant city can be reimagined.
If an identifiable set of legal developments arising under specific historical contexts lead to the
proliferation of these models of the immigrant city, another set of legal developments, hopefully
more conscious and considered in its approach, could uphold a competing model that imagines
local communities as valuable partners in our immigration project. Thus, in Part III.C, I explain
how understanding the immigrant city as a legal concept in this manner sets the groundwork for
exploring possible alternative conceptualization of the immigrant city, which we will turn to in
Part IV.
A. The Conventional Account: Doctrinal Divergence
The Constitution does not expressly delegate immigration powers to the federal government.76
Nevertheless, it is now almost universally accepted that immigration is an exclusive federal
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issue.77 Indeed, one can hardly dispute the federal government’s strong interest in immigration.
Immigration implicates not only the sovereign integrity of our nation’s geographic borders, but
also the democratic integrity of our national polity.
The fact that immigration is an issue of national importance, however, does not necessarily
explain the relative absence of any discussion of immigration from a local perspective. In
contrast, federal involvement in domestic issues such as housing, transportation, and urban
economic development has produced an immense body of literature focusing on the impact of
federal policies on the organization of local communities. Rather, I suggest that the striking
absence of such analysis results from two peculiar features of the development of contemporary
immigration regulations: the federalization of immigration law and the federalization of the
immigrant population. It is the operation of both of these processes that has led immigration to
be conceived of as a national issue even when we are discussing its local impacts.
1. The Federalization of Immigration Law
For almost a century after this country’s founding, state, local, and federal authorities all played a
role in immigration. As Professor Neuman pointed out, in absence of federal restrictions on
immigration the states enacted and local governments enforced78 a variety of legislative
measures regulating the immigration of convicts, paupers, the disabled, those suspected of
carrying contagious diseases, and free blacks and slaves.79 Moreover, aside from restrictions, all
levels of government took steps to recruit immigrants80 and assist in their settlement.81 The
federal government enacted laws establishing minimum health and safety requirements for
steamships carrying immigrants to our shores and sought to encourage settlement by providing
federal land,82 while “in almost every state” and “supplemented by local associations in cities
and towns for the same purpose,” legislations were passed to establish “bureau[s] of immigration
whose purpose is the inviting of immigration and assisting immigrants in the procuring of
suitable homes.”83
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In the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, immigration doctrinally evolved into an
exclusive federal issue. Noting that immigration implicated federal concerns such as foreign
affairs, international trade, sovereignty, and national security, the Supreme Court proclaimed that
“the passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to
our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.”84 To be sure, this proclamation preceded
any substantial federal involvement in immigration. But because this reallocation of power also
led several state immigration statutes to be struck down, it prompted the federal government to
step in to fill the legal void, which, for the most part, simply meant replicating many of the same
restrictions that had since then been imposed by states and localities.85
The irony of this federalization lies in the fact that although the Court justified federal
exclusivity on the basis of the national and transnational interests involved in immigration, the
federal government’s initial forays into this field revealed a solidly local outlook. Both the
renegotiation of the Burlingame Treaty with China in 1880 and the Chinese Exclusion Act that
followed were largely based on the federal government’s distress at the local impact of
immigration.86 The subsequent adoption of two of the oldest immigration restrictions — the
exclusion of those likely to become a public charge and the deportation of immigrant convicts —
transformed state and local regulations concerning immigrant paupers and local criminal activity
into a federal immigration restriction long before the federal government began to play an active
role in providing welfare services to indigent residents or regulating local criminal activities.87
Indeed, even the very first restrictive federal immigration statute, the Page Law of 1875
prohibiting the entry of Chinese women for “lewd and immoral purposes,” focused primarily on
the preservation of the traditional family structures — what many consider to be “the
quintessential symbol of localism.”88
Moreover, despite the jurisprudential federalization of immigration law in the late nineteenth
century, states and localities continued to enact de facto immigration regulations. They imposed
restrictions on the ability of immigrants to own land,89 work on public projects,90 operate certain
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business,91 or engage in trades that involved state resources92 — all of which required the
Supreme Court to draw and revise countless jurisprudential lines and rebalance myriad
competing interests in order to reconcile state and local police powers with the exclusive plenary
power of the federal government over immigration, with no clear rule in sight. As a result, in
recent years states and localities have continued to use local laws to influence the flow and
incorporation of immigrant populations into their jurisdictions. The English-only movement and
Proposition 187 are some of the most cited examples of anti-immigrant activities by sub-national
governments.93 Others, such as the efforts by some local communities to pass and enforce
housing code regulations in response to the overcrowded living conditions of immigrant
households and anti-loitering provisions to control or outlaw the congregation of immigrant daylaborers, are also examples of local regulatory activities that are intended as local immigration
restrictions.94
These accounts of local involvement in immigration, however, are for the most part but a
footnote in the overarching narrative. Immigration law is almost universally considered a
distinctly federal affair involving federal interests and national concerns. As such, the
presumption of federal exclusivity tends to render the entire subject of immigration uniquely
separate from local issues or local governments.
2. The Federalization of the Immigrant Population
The presumption that immigration laws are in the exclusive province of the federal government
goes far in maintaining the federal/local divide with regard to immigration. But, as I noted
above, it does not fully account for the almost exclusive federal orientation endemic in the
contemporary immigration debates. Therefore, to excavate the reason for this peculiarity
requires us to delve deeper into the evolution of contemporary immigration law — beyond the
fact that immigration law was federalized, to the corresponding fact that, in many ways, the
immigrants themselves were as well.
What this means is that not only do we think of immigration as a federal issue, but we also tend
to think of immigrants as a federal, and ultimately hypothetical, population. Exclusionary
immigration controls that regulate who may enter this country and the conditions upon which
they may remain have worked to conceptually remap the nation’s boundaries: instead of being
limited to the geographic boundaries of this country, it now appears to be drawn around the
individual immigrants themselves. As Professor Ngai suggests, it is as if the “nation’s borders
(the point of exclusion) collaps[ed] into and bec[ame] indistinguishable from the inner (the space
of inclusion).”95 Conceptually, as a result, where an immigrant resides, a pocket of federal
jurisdiction is thought to exist.
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Moreover, the structure of federal enforcement now primarily relies on a system of federal
classification that “discriminates, surveys, and produces immigrant identities.”96 Multiple and
malleable immigrant statuses are the foundation of our immigration regime, and the flexible
partition between legality and illegality has given the federal government substantial control over
the political, social, and cultural identity of immigrants in this country.97 Therefore, just as the
federalization of immigration law conceptually removed immigration from local government
scholar’s field of view, the federalization of immigrants rendered the immigrants themselves
conceptually and, in the case of most illegal immigrations, literally invisible in the local spaces
in which they reside.
Even now, the federalization of immigrants plays a significant role in distorting traditional
debates over local issues when immigrants are involved. When immigrants overcrowd
inadequate housing or residents flee a community experiencing an immigrant influx, too often
the traditional local government concerns about affordable housing and the propensity of existing
local government laws to promote metropolitan sprawl are cast aside to focus on the federal
immigration policies that sanctioned, or failed to restrict, the immigrant’s entry into this country
in the first place.98 When immigrant residents burden local services, questions regarding the
funding structure are frequently neglected to concentrate on the lack of federal support for “its”
population.99 When immigrants deviate from local community norms by committing crimes that
are largely defined by state and local governments, the most pressing concern is too often not
how they will be punished or rehabilitated pursuant to local laws, or how local policies can be
adopted to make our communities safer, but whether their actions constitute cause for
deportation.100 Indeed, even when the cities erupt in violence as they did during the Los Angeles
riots of 1992, the presence of immigrants in the midst of this chaos lead many to demand a
moratorium on future immigration instead of focusing on the concentration of poverty, racial
tensions, and economic dislocation that the current local legal framework has engendered.101
B. Three Models of the Immigrant City
Thus far, I have described the conventional account of immigration and how this account
primarily relies on the federal interests to justify the presumption federal exclusivity. What has
yet to be determined is whether this presumption is not only a result of interests from above, but
is also influenced by concerns from below.
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This section argues that although exclusive federal power over immigration is usually justified
on the grounds that immigration is “a national matter[] . . . intrusted [sic] to the government of
the Union,”102 concerns about “local matters” also play a substantial role in buttressing the
presumption of federal exclusivity. Indeed, I find traces of three competing “models” of the
immigrant city in judicial, legislative, and political developments that have contributed to our
contemporary understanding of the issue of immigration. Moreover, although these models
adhere to conflicting concerns about the immigrant city, they are oriented toward the same result:
disengaging the city from issues of immigration and disentangling the immigrant from the local
communities in which they reside.
1. The Immigrant City as a Threat to Immigrants
For those concerned about the rights of immigrants, the common wisdom is that local
governments are especially threatening to immigrant residents. More so than the nation as a
whole, local communities are regarded as hotbeds of intense xenophobia that are structurally
inclined to adopt policies that discriminate against immigrant minorities in their midst.103 As this
section demonstrates, one can discern this view of the immigrant city in three of the most
prominent doctrinal pillars of contemporary immigration law: the plenary power doctrine, Yick
Wo, and the political function doctrine.
On the one hand, this fear of local oppression arises from a general distrust of municipal
power.104 In these cases, we see reoccurring concerns about the constitutional boundaries that
restrain state and local power. On the other hand, the view that immigrants are particularly
susceptible to local discrimination has also led jurists to encourage the very condition by which
immigrants are made susceptible to political oppression at the hands of a local majority. In the
name of protecting immigrants, jurists have advanced the assumption that the legal identity of
immigrants is largely defined by the relationship between the United States and the immigrant’s
country of origin. Although such an orientation provides a measure of federal protection for
immigrants facing local oppression, it also pushes the immigrant population away from being
seen as a part of the local communities within which they reside and towards being understood as
federal wards under the direct and exclusive charge of the federal government.
a. The Plenary Power Doctrine. — No doctrine dominates the jurisprudential reasoning of
immigration law more than the plenary power doctrine. At the same time, it is also one of the
most heavily criticized doctrines of constitutional jurisprudence.105 As the doctrine arose from
102
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disputes about the treatment of immigrants at the local level, it is worthwhile to consider how it
influenced, and was influenced by, concerns about the immigrant city.
Indeed, what is striking about the early plenary power cases is how hostile the courts were to
decentralized power. Consider, for example, the two cases that solidified the federal
government’s plenary power over immigration vis-à-vis state and local governments: Henderson
v. Mayor of New York106 and Chy Lung v. Freeman.107 In Henderson, the Court was asked to
review a uniform head tax levied against immigrants to compensate for the fiscal and social
strain of supporting immigrant paupers.108 In Chy Lung, the Court was presented with a similar
local effort to seek payment from immigrants — a California statute that granted local customs
officials broad discretionary power to demand bond or payment for landing immigrant
passengers that are deemed, among other things, “likely to become a public charge, . . . or likely
soon to become so, or is a convicted criminal, or a lewd or debauched woman.”109 Decided in
the same term, the Supreme Court struck down both statutes for interfering with the federal
government’s exclusive power over immigration and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, in doing so,
the Court expressed strong reservations about local power and its effects on immigrants and the
interests of the nation as a whole.
First, the Court was concerned about the potential for abuse when local officials are granted
broad discretionary powers. In Chy Lung, the Court criticized the state statute for “plac[ing] in
the hands of a single man the power to prevent entirely vessels engaged in foreign trade, say with
China, from carrying passengers, or to compel them to submit to systematic extortion of the
grossest kind.”110 As the Court explained, “individual foreigners, however, distinguished at
home for their social, their literary, or their political character, are helpless in the presence of this
potent commissioner. . . . and so a silly, an obstinate, or a wicked commissioner may bring
disgrace upon the whole country, the enmity of a power nation, or the loss of an equally
powerful friend.”111 Moreover, looking at the enforcement structure, the Court concluded that
“[i]ts manifest purpose . . . is, not to obtain indemnity, but money.”112 To be sure, in these cases,
the “local” officials that the Court chastised were officials of the state and not local governments.
Nevertheless, as we will see, the language employed by the Court here would be adopted and
echoed even more forcefully with respect to local government officials in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.
Second, the doctrine also relied on viewing the immigrant population as an extension of the
foreign sovereigns from which they immigrated. Immigrant rights were therefore understood as
arising less from domestic constitutional protections and more from diplomatic obligations. As
the Court explained in Henderson, striking down the state’s restriction vindicated “the protection
which the foreigner has a right to expect from the Federal government when he lands here a
stranger, owing allegiance to another government, and looking to it for such protection as grows
out of his relation to that government.”113 In other words, the Court was concerned that although
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aliens “have some virtual representation in Washington by means of the foreign affairs
establishment,” neither state nor local governments are institutionally accountable in the same
manner.114
Of course, as much as these cases federalized the issue of immigration, they did not overtly
dismiss the sphere of local police powers over immigrants. The Supreme Court did not directly
question the ability of state and local governments to exclude paupers, lunatics, and those
carrying contagious diseases from their jurisdiction in the interest of local self-preservation. 115
But the court’s decision also left state and local governments with very little room to exercise the
police powers that they might have possessed. By questioning the ability of local officials to
make the determination of whether an immigrant is to be categorized as an individual who can be
regulated by local police powers, as the Court did with respect to the procedure outlined in Chy
Lung, while at the same time questioning a state’s ability to charge a uniform fee across the
board to compensate for the inevitable entry of such immigrants, as the Court did in Henderson,
the Court left very little room for any residual police powers to operate.
More importantly, these early plenary power cases reveal an internal tension in this model of the
immigrant city. If one of the underlying motivations of the plenary power decisions was the
Court’s desire to protect immigrants from local oppression, this doctrine also simultaneously
undermines immigrant participation in local politics and empowerment through the exercise of
local power rather than this nation’s “foreign affairs establishment.” Thus, although these cases
secured temporary relief for immigrants, it also pushed the immigrant population away from
being viewed as component parts of the local political community and toward their construction
as guests under the care of the federal government. It is therefore no surprise that the ascension
of the plenary power doctrine and the increasing understanding of immigration as an issue
entwined with foreign affairs coincided with the precipitous decline of alien suffrage in the
United States.116
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b. Yick Wo v. Hopkins. — A similar distrust of local decentralization can also be seen in the
well-known case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.117 As any student of constitutional law would likely
recount, Yick Wo is not only one of the first cases to apply the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to governmental acts of racial discrimination, but it also set the legal
precedent for proving such a violation when laws that are neutral on its face are applied by
government officials in a discriminatory manner. As the Court held, although the ordinance
passed by the City of San Francisco in this case merely required all laundry businesses that
operated out of wooden facilities to apply for a license in order to continue their operations, the
fact that almost all non-Chinese applicants were able to secure a license while Chinese applicants
were almost uniformly denied constituted an application of law “with a mind so unequal and
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of laws”
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.118
For immigration scholars, Yick Wo also established an equally significant precedent with regard
to the constitutional status of immigrant aliens. Noting that the Fourteenth Amendment
conspicuously referred to “peoples” and not “citizens,” the Court proclaimed that its “provisions
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”119
These two lines of argument dominate much of the discussion of Yick Wo. Nevertheless, this
conventional analysis overlooks a substantial portion of the opinion regarding the municipal
power of the City of San Francisco to enact or implement its ordinance. Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Yick Wo was not merely troubled by the fact that the City of San Francisco applied its
regulatory regime with an “evil eye and unequal hand” against its Chinese residents. The Court
was also concerned about the governing principles regulating “the quasi legislative acts of
inferior municipal bodies” and the responsibility of “judicial tribunals [to] pronounce upon the
reasonableness and consequent validity of their by-laws.”120
That municipal power was a central focus of the Court’s analysis is hardly surprising when one
takes note of the manner in which this case was presented to the Court. The primary arguments
did not focus on whether aliens were entitled to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In fact, notwithstanding the Court’s memorable pronouncement that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects aliens and native citizens alike, the City of San Francisco never asserted otherwise.
Rather, the arguments centered on the powers delegated by the California Constitution to the
city. Whereas counsel for the city described San Francisco as an “Imperial City” and repeatedly
asserted that California’s Home Rule provisions imbued the city with “general legislative power”
equal to that of the state and which “ordinary municipalities did not possess,”121 the petitioner’s
brief began with the assertion that “it is against natural right to make [operating laundaries]
dependent upon the arbitrary will of the [city’s] Board of Supervisors” and cited Dillon’s
Treatise on Municipal Corporations to argue that municipalities do not have the power to define
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what constitutes a nuisance through local legislation.122 In other words, although the race and
alienage of the Chinese laundrymen were important to the determination of the case, the general
municipal powers of the city was also a central issue in the case.
It is therefore fitting that in the sections preceding the Supreme Court’s penultimate conclusion
about the constitutionality of San Francisco’s enforcement of its local ordinance, the Court’s
discussion was focused predominately on the scope of the city’s power to regulate local
laundries. Invoking two state court cases, neither of which implicated the Fourteenth
Amendment nor involved any allegations of racial or alienage discrimination, Justice Matthews
cautioned that courts must be wary of situations in which an “ordinance, passed under grants of
power [from the state] . . . is so clearly unreasonable, so arbitrary, oppressive, or partial, as to
raise the presumption that the [state] legislature never intended to confer the power to pass it, and
to justify the courts in interfering and setting it aside as a plain abuse of authority.”123 Therefore,
just as it was deemed unreasonable for the City of Cincinnati in State v. Cincinnati Gas-Light &
Coke Co. to fix the price of gas to force a local gas company to submit to an unfair appraisement
of their work, 124 or for the City of Baltimore in City of Baltimore v. Radecke to give the mayor
the power to grant and revoke licenses for the use of steam-engines within the city,125 the Court
explained that “ordinance[s] which clothe[] a single individual” with the discretion to permit or
exclude a particular business, “hardly falls within the domain of law, and [the courts] are
constrained to pronounce it inoperative and void.”126
It is interesting to note that although the Court’s discussion repeatedly questioned the legitimacy
of imbuing an individual with “personal and arbitrary power,” in none of these cases did the
municipal governments delegate administrative power to anyone other than an elected official.
The “individuals” that the Court spoke of were none other than the municipal officials involved
in either drafting (the Board of Supervisors in Yick Wo and the City Council in Cincinnati GasLight & coke Co.) or enforcing (The Mayor in City of Baltimore) the ordinances in question. In
this manner, the Court’s critique replicates much of the same distrust of local discretion set forth
in the Court’s earlier plenary power cases. Yet, instead of confining its criticism to
administrative officials charged with the enforcement of a particular statute or ordinance, it
extends the same critique to government officials that constitute the core of a locality’s
democratic institution.
This perspective also casts light on the Court’s citation to Dillon’s Treatise on Municipal
Corporations at the beginning of its constitutional analysis. Notwithstanding the fact that the city
of San Francisco claimed to possess broad and inherent powers to regulate businesses and local
activity to serve the public interest — an interpretation that received the support of the California
Supreme Court127 — the Court in this case started with Dillon’s doctrinal presumption that
“every [local] by-law must be reasonable, not inconstant with the charter of the corporation, nor
with any statute of parliament, nor with the general principles of the common law of the land,
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particularly those having relation to the liberty of the subject, or the rights of private
property.”128 It is well known that Dillon’s fear of municipal power was founded primarily upon
his conviction that local governments often distort the workings of the private market by
participating in the private sector or enacting municipal regulations to favor certain forms of
private activity over others.129 Similarly, the Court’s analysis in this case evinces a similar
sentiment. As the Court explained, the potential for abuse lies in the fact that municipal
corporations
may, and quite likely will, bring ruin to the business of those against whom they are
directed, while others, from whom they are withheld, may be actually benefited by what
is thus done to their neighbors; and, when we remember that this action or non-action
may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism
and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment, and difficult to be
detected and exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest on comment upon the injustice
capable of being wrought under cover of such a power.130
In the end, because the actual administration of the ordinance sufficiently demonstrated irrational
discrimination against Chinese residents, the Supreme Court found that it did not need to pass
upon the validity of the San Francisco ordinance in the abstract. There was no indication,
however, that the exceptional circumstances in this case negated the underlying basis for its
concern. Indeed, the Court never disclaimed its municipal power analysis as being irrelevant. In
contrast, it simply held that because of the facts presented in this case, it needs not “reason from
the probable to the actual” in deciding the validity of the statute. In other words, in addition to
being a case about protecting racial minorities or immigrant rights, Yick Wo also appears to be
an affirmation of the limited and constrained role of local governments in its vision of the
constitutional order.131
I do not mean to argue that the conventional understanding of Yick Wo is incorrect. I do
suggest, however, that it may be incomplete. I present this alternative reading of Yick Wo as a
challenge to the conventional belief that alienage cases in immigration doctrine turn entirely on
the Court’s assessment of the position of noncitizen aliens relative to citizens. Its perception of
the appropriate scope of local government powers also affects how it weighed the legitimacy of a
city’s regulatory activity against immigrant aliens. In other words, what was at stake was not
simply immigrants rights, but also the boundaries of local power with respect to immigrants in
our constitutional order.
c. Discrete and Insular Minority and the Political Function Doctrine. — As we have seen,
concerns about the immigrant city as a threat to immigrants have, on the one hand, compelled the
courts to construe immigrants as a federal population in order to justify their protection from
local oppression while, on the other hand, pushed for further federalization of alienage
regulations because of fears that immigrants are susceptible to local oppression. In seeking to
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protect the immigrant in this manner, however, the Court seems to promote the very conditions
that generated the need for judicial intervention in the first place. Here, we see traces of this
development in the contemporary intersection of the plenary power doctrine and Yick Wo: the
political function doctrine.
The political function doctrine arose from concerns about local discrimination against noncitizen
immigrants, but eventually evolved into a general statement on the membership of immigrants in
local communities. Following the principles outlined in Yick Wo, the Court had declared that
because of their inability to participate in the political process, “[a]liens as a class are a prime
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority” and therefore regulations discriminating against
them are subject to “close judicial scrutiny.”132 At the same time, adopting the perspective that
immigrants are inherently a federal population, the federal status of immigrants with regard to
the national polity became all the more important in determining the membership of immigrants
in the local political community. Thus, although most alienage discrimination at the local level
is subject to strict scrutiny, the public function doctrine carved out an exception for
discrimination that is “employed in defining [the] ‘political community.’”133
The basic premise of the public function doctrine is that “persons holding state elective or
important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions . . . [who] perform functions
that go to the heart of representative government” can be required by state and local governments
to have federal citizenship.134 As a result, the central question in these cases is whether the
position at issue “go[es] to the heart of representative government.” Without an apparent brightline rule, the Court has applied this exception to teachers,135 policemen,136 and probation
officers,137 but not to lawyers,138 notary publics,139 or general civil service positions.140
To be sure, our federalist system gives states and localities broad discretion to define the
membership of its polity without regard to membership in the national community.141
Nevertheless, instead of justifying the political function doctrine on the ground that states and
localities have discretion in this regard, the Court’s rationale continued to construe immigrants as
a federal population by relying on the federal consequences of alienage and applying it across the
132
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board. As the Court explained, “[t]he exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is
not a deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the community's
process of political self-definition . . . Aliens are by definition those outside of this
community.”142 As such, the federal definition of “aliens” with regard to their membership in
the national community is here employed as the baseline for state and local governments as well.
Yet, by championing immigrant exclusion from the local political community, this doctrine tends
toward a vision of local communities as those in which immigrants are not a part, and solidifies
the role of the court as the final arbiter of the manner in which local communities can consider
alienage when enacting local policies. Thus, by implicitly endorsing the exclusion of immigrants
from the local polity, the Court entrenches the view of the immigrant city as an ever looming
threat to immigrants at the same time it attempts to provide cities with a measure of institutional
discretion.
2. The Immigrant City as a Threat to the Nation and the States
The model of the immigrant city as a threat to immigrants comports with the Madisonian view of
local governments as vehicles for majoritarian oppression.143 But if much of this concern arises
from the political impotence of noncitizen immigrants, could local governments not also serve as
a democratic tool by which their interest could be mobilized, represented, and put into action?
Although local governments are often defended as conducive to democratic participation, when
it comes to immigrant cities, these ideals are often contested. Indeed, the legal developments
explored in this section reveal that immigrant political participation at the local level often raises
fears that cities are too easily co-opted by immigrant interests. As a result, not only is the
immigrant city perceived as a threat to the immigrants, but the immigrant city is also often
simultaneously construed as a threat to the integrity and interests of the nation and its
constitutive states.
The writings of DeTocqueville, which are often employed as a counterpoint to the Madisonian
account, aptly illustrate this concern. On the one hand, DeTocqueville wrote strongly and
passionately about the contributions of local governments.144 On the other hand, his writing
reveals a deep-seated concern about large city governments and their immigrant populations:
The lower orders which inhabit [America’s largest] cities constitute a rabble even more
formidable than the populace of European towns. They consist of free blacks . . . [and] a
multitude of Europeans who have been driven to the shores of the New World by their
misfortunes or their misconduct . . . . I look upon the size of certain American cities, and
especially on the nature of their population, as a real danger which threatens the future
security of the democratic republics of the New World; and I venture to predict that they
will perish from this circumstance unless the Government succeeds in creating an armed
force, which, while it remains under the control of the majority of the nation, will be
independent of the town population, and able to repress its excesses.145
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It is ironic that DeTocqueville, in a treatise espousing the importance of decentralized power and
writing during a time when immigration regulations were largely in the hands of state and local
governments, would anticipate the federalization of immigration and the mobilization of federal
officials to police the urban immigrant population — predicting that “armed force,” accountable
solely to the nation and not the local communities, “was to be the hope not only for city
government but of the nation itself in face of the threat that comes from large cities.”146
In some respect, the concerns that immigrants and cities would concert to frustrate the interests
and goals of the nation and the states arise from the cultural heterogeneity of the immigrant
city.147 But this fear is also, more importantly, based on the legal framework of municipal
governance and political decentralization in the United States. Instead of seeing the city as being
controlled by native contingents bent on frustrating the rights and privileges of immigrants,
however, this model posits just the opposite: immigrant cities are prone to being co-opted by
immigrant interests, which in turn poses unique threats to national- and state-level policies.148
Moreover, as we proceed in this section, we should take note of the degree to which state and
local interests diverge. As we have seen, most accounts of the “local” do not distinguish
between state and municipal governments. This section, however, reveals that this distinction is
critical. In many instances, the states feel just as, if not more, threatened by their immigrant
cities than the nation as a whole.
a. The Municipal Reform Movement and Local Political Participation. — For immigration and
local government scholars, the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century were a
pivotal era. Not only did this period mark one of the most significant and contentious influx of
immigrants in American history, but it also witnessed a fundamental transformation of American
society from an agrarian to a largely urbanized society.149 America was becoming an immigrant
country at the same time it was realizing that “the twentieth century city [would] be decisive of
national destiny.”150
At the same time commentators were beginning to realize the transformative impact of
immigration and urbanization, there was also widespread alarm over these developments. More
importantly, concerns about immigration and cities were essentially intertwined. Many believed
that the physical and political ills of the American city were the result of its immigrant residents.
Not surprisingly, advocates for municipal reform and immigration restrictions found a lot of
146
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common ground and often worked hand-in-hand: in cities like Boston, “many leaders of
[municipal] reform were leaders of the Immigration Restriction League.”151
Indeed, the “political machines,” which for many signified the failings of city governments, were
inextricably tied to the intellectual inaptitude or political deviance of the immigrant “masses.”152
Many municipal reformers who were theoretically committed to political decentralization were
wary of the capacity that immigrants and their children, who made up the vast majority of the
urban population, had for democratic self-rule. For example, Wilcox, who was at times a strong
advocate of municipal power, cautiously warned of the corrupting influence of these foreign
elements: “America’s condition is analogous to that of a club originally composed of more or
less select class brought together by a common experience and a common intelligence for
furtherance of certain great ends, but later well-nigh swamped by the influx of strangers with
little notion of the original purposes of the club and meager training for membership in it.”153
Rather than attributing the rise of machine politics to ignorance, other municipal reformers
believed that immigrants were “deliberately vot[ing] in support of the theory that government is
for the benefit of those who govern” and “stolidly submitting to the band of pirates who have
cast its municipal institutions into the quicksand of corruption.”154
As a result, at the same time municipal reformers were pushing for local governments to assume
a more prominent role in American politics,155 anti-immigrant forces joined up with municipal
reformers to disentangle immigrant residents from local governments. Their goal was to
depoliticize the city by removing politics from urban government and restructuring local
governments into efficient administrative apparatuses, either through a government of
independent boards and commissions that would govern at a distance from neighborhood-level
demands and concerns, or a city-manager structure in which an executive would run the day-today affairs of the city without undue intrusion by the political process.156 In each of these, the
ultimate, and in many cases, intended effect was the disentanglement of immigrants and other
“undesirable” municipal residents from the day-to-day operations of the city.157
Although the municipal reform movement generated substantial interest among political and
business elites in the Northeast, cities in the Southwestern states actually adopted municipal
reform much more readily than their New England counterparts.158 Political scientists and urban
scholars have long debated why this regional variation occurred. The dominant “class theory”
posits that municipal reform was largely a middle-class movement with support from local
business elites.159 Nevertheless, noting the largely inconclusive nature of these endeavors, some
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scholars have sought to find alternative explanations.160 For example, Professor Bridges and
Kronick point out that the success of the municipal reform movement in the Southern and
Western states might be better explained by concurrent state efforts to disenfranchise immigrant
and minority voters. In other words, “reformers were able to win where they could shape the
electorate by disfranchising their opponents and were most successful where their opponents
were weak at the polls.”161 In other words, the cities in which municipal reform was most
successful were also ones in which the state stepped in to suppress, and therefore redefine, the
local electorate.162
That last point is worth repeating: legal reforms of local governments at the state level were
crucial to the success of municipal reform in many communities because it shaped the local
electorate in ways that made these structural reforms possible. Underlying this intrusion by the
state was a fundamental distrust of local governments because they were perceived as being
unduly and easily influenced by working-class minority and immigrant elements.163
Moreover, in seeking to fix the city, the reform movement also drastically altered the
institutional role of the city relative to its most needy and vulnerable residents. Notwithstanding
the fact that in the beginning, a noteworthy faction in the municipal reform movement believed
that machine politics “would disappear once the city itself provided the services currently offered
by the boss,” the National Municipal League, which led the reform movement, “diagnosed
municipal ills ‘as a problem of institutional structure and governmental machinery.’”164 As a
result, the reform model “not only endorsed political and administrative arrangements, but also a
very limited sphere of local government.”165
Even today, immigrant communities are wrestling with the effects of state mandated or state
facilitated reform and its effect on immigrant representation in local governments. To be sure, a
few municipalities currently allow immigrants to vote in specific or general local elections.166
Nevertheless, other cities that have sought to join that group have been unable to secure state
approval even after garnering local support for that proposition.167 Moreover, studies have found
that the municipal organization of local governments continues to have measurable effects on the
political participation of immigrant groups who, having naturalized, are entitled to vote.168
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b. City of Pasadena v. Charlesville. — The preceding section illustrates that notwithstanding the
tendency of most immigration scholars to conflate state and local governments, the two often
have divergent interests with regard to immigrants. It is therefore no surprise that concerns about
municipal entanglements with immigrants would also arise as an important site of legal
contention about the contours of municipal home rule in the following decades. In this vein, the
California Supreme Court’s decision in City of Pasadena v. Charlesville169 presents a fascinating
look into how divergent interests between state and local governments can lead to incongruous
results on related issues. As we see, even when cities are granted broad discretion to handle
local issues, introducing immigrants into the judicial equation radically alters the balance.
In Charlesville, the City of Pasadena “petition[ed] for a writ of mandate to compel the
respondent as city manager of the city . . . to sign a contract authorized by the board of directors
of said city for the construction of a galvanized fence around the Allen reservoir, a property
owned and used by said city as part of its municipally owned and operated water supply and
distributive system.”170 The city manager’s refusal to sign the contract was based upon his belief
that it violated state law. First, he contends, the contract did not contain a specification of the
“prevailing rate of per diem wages as required by the Public Wage Act of 1931,” and second, it
failed to include “a provision forbidding the employment of noncitizen immigrants as provided
by the Public Works Alien Employment Act of 1931.”171 The city does not dispute its
noncompliance with these regulations. Rather, Pasadena argues that as a city with a “freeholder”
charter (more commonly known as a “home rule” charter), it need not comply with the state’s
public works requirement because the project was a “municipal affair.”172
On its face, Charlesville presents a fairly straightforward legal question. It was well-accepted
that municipalities were exempt from compliance with state laws with regard to municipal
affairs. The only question was whether the exception applied.173 From this perspective, there
appears to be two ways that this case can be resolved. On the one hand, if one focuses on the
nature of the project itself — the construction of a fence around a municipal water source — the
municipal affairs exception seems appropriate. The city appears to be acting in its most private
capacity: it was entering into a contract and paying with municipal funds to complete a project
for the sole benefit of local residents. On the other hand, if one focuses on the manner by which
the project was to be completed — through the use of laborers who may not be paid a prevailing
wage or possess citizenship — there is a strong argument that Pasadena transgressed the
boundaries of its municipal powers. Unlike the municipal project in question, the effect of its
activities on wages and hiring cannot be easily confined to the boundaries of the municipality.
In theory, these two approaches are mutually exclusive. Moreover, they should dictate the same
result with respect to both the prevailing wage and citizenship requirements. In a unanimous
decision, however, the Charlesville court adopted analytical elements from both to reach
different conclusions on the propriety of the city’s noncompliance. In doing so, the court’s
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reasoning exposed how legal regulations relating to immigrants often drastically affect court’s
conception of municipal power even when cities are granted significant local control over their
affairs.
With respect to the prevailing wage requirement, the court focused almost entirely on the project
itself to conclude that, notwithstanding any extra-municipal impacts the city’s noncompliance
may have on the state’s labor market, its activity was a “municipal affair.” As the court
explained, all the component parts of the project were municipal affairs: “the improvement
contemplated by the contract . . . [whose] sole purpose . . . is the construction of a wire fence
around a reservoir which is part of the city’s municipal system,” “the control of [local]
expenditure,” and the “hiring of employees generally by the city to perform labor and services in
connection with its municipal affairs and the payment of the city’s funds for services rendered to
the city by its employees in the administration of its municipal affairs” are all themselves
municipal affairs.174
In contrast, the court’s analysis of noncitizen immigrant employment on municipal works took a
dramatic about-turn. First, the court did not center its inquiry on the project itself. Instead, it
focused more specifically on the city’s actions by framing the legal question as one over whether
“the employment of aliens on public works [was] one of local concern and a municipal affair.”175
Second, and most important, the court subverted its previous municipal affairs analysis by
declaring that municipal property was essentially state property. It did this by redefining the
state and all its “agencies” as trustees for the citizens of the state: “All public works and all
public property in the state in a broad sense belong to all the people of the state. Whether the
ownership or title thereof be in the state or in a municipality . . . such ownership and title are held
in trust for the people of the state.”176 Having done so, the court was quick to conclude that the
employment of noncitizen immigrants on municipal works implicated state sovereignty, and as
such “constitute the subject-matter thereof of general state concern as distinguished from local or
municipal affair.”177 Moreover, the court emphasized that as creatures of the state,
municipalities had an obligation to protect municipal property qua state property: “since the
property and funds of the state and its agencies, in a broad sense, belong to its citizens, it would
seem to be a wise and beneficent state policy so to conduct its affairs that its funds be available
to its citizens for services rendered on public works.”178
Note the court’s conceptual moves here. When it was assumed that all the individuals involved
were citizens, the court was willing to construe the city as essentially a private entity
representing the interests of its residents. The introduction of noncitizen immigrants, however,
drastically changed the overall equation. Because, from the court’s perspective, the most
significant dichotomy was no longer between the city and the state, but between citizens and
noncitizens, the court’s earlier municipal affairs analysis did not factor into its assessment of
noncitizen employment at all. The role of the city also changed accordingly. It was construed as
an organ of the state, and therefore its property and funds were essentially state resources held in
174
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trust. The independent municipal ownership that factored so prominently in the court’s earlier
assessment no longer remained. In short, as the immigrant gained in legal prominence, the city
— as a legal, political, or economic entity — seemed to disappear entirely from view.
c. Local Sanctuary Policies and City of New York v. U.S. — The recent controversy over local
enforcement of immigration laws suggests that fears of the immigrant city as a threat to the
nation and the states continue to be pertinent in today’s immigration debates. Already, a wide
range of legal disagreements over this issue have placed localities in an awkward position. On
the one hand, a vigorous debate rages over whether local police officials even have the power to
enforce federal immigration laws179 or whether such power is reserved exclusively for federal
officials by nature of federal preemption.180 On the other hand, assuming local enforcement is
permitted, others disagree over whether federal immigration laws require local officials to
cooperate with the federal government181 or whether cooperation must be at the discretion of
local communities.182
At the center of this debate are the well-known inadequacies of immigration enforcement. As
efforts to physically secure the nation’s boundaries are increasingly exposed as both inefficient
and insufficient, proponents of enforcement have begun looking to local government officials to
assist in its patrol of the country’s interior. Yet, as the growing need for local support in
immigration enforcement becomes more pervasive and local surveillance more necessary, cities
are also becoming aware of their ability to challenge and redefine immigration categories
through local policy.
Indeed, in recent decades many cities have taken steps to restrict local law enforcement and
administrative officials from cooperating with federal enforcement by adopting so-called
sanctuary policies. Currently, there are at least 35 state and local governments, including the
cities of New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, San Diego, Portland, Seattle, and
Washington D.C., that have taken steps to limit the ability of their officials to enforce federal
immigration laws or cooperate with federal immigration officials.183 These jurisdictions often
defend their policies on the ground that local immigration enforcement strains the relationship
between police and immigrants, promotes the socio-political isolation of immigrant
communities, endangers the health and safety of immigrant and native residents, and puts
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substantial fiscal strain on already taxed police departments tasked with dealing with more
pressing local issues.184
The manner in which localities are experimenting with different levels of immigration
enforcement based on local priorities, however, has not gone unnoticed. Because sanctuary
cities are often those with large immigrant populations that are “able to exert domestic political
pressure against INS enforcement . . . [or] facilitate illegal migrants’ ability to melt into the
community,”185 many have questioned whether these communities are more aligned with
immigrants than national interests in resisting cooperation with federal authorities. As a result,
steps have been taken by both states186 and the federal government to limit local sanctuary
policies.187
Again, at the heart of this controversy is how we understand the proper institutional role of local
governments with respect to their residents and the larger governmental bodies within which
they are situated. Although facially described as an immigration issue, the controversy over
local sanctuary policies raises deeper concerns about what constitutes the relevant community
when the issue of immigration is raised. Consider, for example, the Second Circuit case of City
of New York v. U.S.188 At issue in the case was a series of executive orders issued by successive
mayors of New York since 1989 that limit the ability of “any City officer or employee [to]
transmit[] information regarding the immigration status of any individual to federal immigration
authorities.”189 Because provisions of the 1996 Welfare and Immigration Act threatened the
validity of this policy by prohibiting any state or local regulation that restricted their employees
from reporting immigrant-statuses to federal authorities, the city under Mayor Giuliani filed a
facial constitutional challenge.190
From the city’s perspective, the challenged provisions “strike at the heart of local government
autonomy.”191 Relying on the new federalist interpretation of the Tenth Amendment set forth in
Printz v. U.S.192 and State of New York v. U.S.,193 the city advanced two arguments. First, it
argued that “state sovereignty under the Amendment includes the power to choose not to
184
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participate in federal regulatory programs and that such power in turn includes the authority to
forbid state or local agencies, officials, and employees from aiding such a program even on a
voluntary basis.”194 Second, the city contends that the Tenth Amendment prevents the federal
government from intruding on the “actual operation of state and local government by, for
example, regulating the use of state and local resources — here officially-acquired information
— and/or the duties or responsibilities of state and local employees.”195
The Second Circuit acknowledged that Printz and State of New York bar the federal government
from directly compelling state or local governments to participate in a federal regulatory
program or “circumvent[ing] th[is] prohibition by conscripting the State's officers directly.”196
The court held, however, that the Congressional regulations in this case neither force the city to
enforce federal immigration laws nor directly conscript local officials to do the same. “Rather,
they prohibit state and local governmental entities or officials only from directly restricting the
voluntary exchange of immigration information with the INS.” As the court explained, allowing
state or local governments to foreclose such voluntary participation by its employees would “turn
the Tenth Amendment's shield” against federal intrusion of state and local sovereignty “into a
sword allowing states and localities to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal
programs.”197
The holding in City of New York is often championed by opponents of local sanctuary policies.
On the basis of the court’s reasoning, however, it is not entirely clear that its conclusion, though
intuitive, follows existing constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, it appears that the court’s
“voluntary exchange” rationale only works when we dismiss the legal significance of local
governments either as political institutions or as private employers. In other words, the court’s
reasoning seems to work best when we privilege the identity of local government officials as
American citizens over their concurrent roles as municipal employees or municipal residents.
To see this, we must begin by examining the court’s rationale. First, was the court correct in
distinguishing the challenged provisions in this case from those involved in Printz or State of
New York? To be sure, Congress did not explicitly require New York City to enforce federal
immigration law or conscript local officials to become federal immigration officers.
Nevertheless, the law left cities with no option other than to tolerate the discretionary
cooperation of individual local officials. In other words, the city is essentially being forced to
participate in federal immigration enforcement and accept de facto conscription of its employees
if its employees independently choose to cooperate. It is not entirely clear that a constitutionally
significant distinction between being forced to participate in a federal regulatory program and
being prohibited from choosing not to cooperate exists. Moreover, the ruling seems to raise a
central concern in both the plenary power cases and Yick Wo about how delegation of
discretionary power to local officials raises the potential for abuse.198 By upholding the federal
restriction in the manner that it did, the Second Circuit essentially requires cities to grant local
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officials far-reaching discretion over their treatment of immigrants without the ability to reign in
or regulate that discretion.199
To be sure, one can argue that the court’s reasoning is actually less concerned about the
operations of the Tenth Amendment than upholding federal plenary power over immigration
enforcement. Recall that the court’s primary reason for refusing to apply the “Tenth Amendment
shield” was because the court believed that cities like New York would use it as a “sword” to
frustrate federal programs. But the city’s policy did nothing to prevent federal immigration
officials from enforcing federal immigration laws. To be sure, federal immigration enforcement
is certainly more difficult without local support. Yet it is hardly distinguishable from the
situation in either Printz or State of New York.
Last, the court’s technical parsing of Printz and State of New York appears to do a disservice to
the substantive constitutional considerations underlying the Tenth Amendment test. As the
Court explained, the primary need for the Tenth Amendment “shield” is to preserve the
constitutional structure of dual sovereignty and ensure that individuals affected by the regulatory
regime could properly assign political accountability to the government that is responsible.200
From this perspective, the challenged federal provisions in City of New York were exceptionally
problematic. The city and amicae went to great lengths to note how permitting local government
officials to essentially become rogue agents of the federal government would strain the
relationship between the local government and immigrant residents because they would likely
see the cooperation as an official policy of the city.
If the court’s reasoning is so vulnerable to criticism, then why is it that City of New York has
largely been exempt from such even while local enforcement of immigration laws remains a hot
topic of discussion? One explanation might be the fact that the court’s reasoning, although
problematic, taps into an underlying concern about immigrant cities like New York becoming
too influenced by local pro-immigrant interest at the expense of federal considerations. Another
is that it successfully presents local government officials as members of the national polity
irrespective of their professional responsibilities to, or membership in, the local communities of
which they are a part. Indeed, support for this reading can be gleaned from the court’s emphasis
on the need for “informed, extensive, and cooperative interaction of a voluntary nature between
sovereign systems for the mutual benefit of each system” in the preservation of a system of dual
sovereignties. It is difficult to understand how cooperative interactions of a voluntary nature are
increased by the challenged provision when state and local communities were free to cooperate
with the federal government before its enactment, but were foreclosed from choosing otherwise
after its enactment. It would appear that the challenged provision can only be understood to
promote voluntary cooperation if the discretion of local government officials is privileged over
that of the representative government that employs them.
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3. The Immigrant City as a Victim of Immigration
Thus far, I have argued that the immigrant city is often construed as a threat to immigrants, the
states, or the nation. Coexisting alongside these accounts of the city, however, is also a more
benign and sympathetic view of the immigrant city. Local communities are also thought of as
being especially vulnerable to the impact of immigrants. As such, the city is often-times
perceived as the ultimate victim of immigrants and immigration policy.
Like the models of the immigrant city explored above, this model of the immigrant city
structures the legal powers of local governments in the immigration framework. Unlike the
previous models, however, this perception of the immigrant city is not only perpetuated by
federal actors, but embraced by state and local officials as well. As we will see, even while
seeking to assist local communities, federal policy continues to neglect the role of local
governments and relegate them to the sidelines of immigration policy. At the same time, instead
of exploring ways in which local government laws can be reformed to better enable local
communities to adjust to the needs of immigrant residents or the burdens occasioned by
population influxes in general, state and local officials often scapegoat immigrants for local ills
while throwing their hands up in frustration by attributing their problems to federal policy.
a. Seeking Federal Reimbursement. — The impact of immigration on contemporary American
cities is both pragmatically irrelevant and discursively crucial. On the one hand, neither
immigration nor immigrant status seems to play a significant part in structuring the daily routines
and prosaic rituals of urban and suburban life. Their demands of local governments are often no
different than that of anyone else, and the impact of their entry into the community are often
difficult to differentiate from natives returning from a foreign country, relocating from a different
state, or moving from a neighboring locality.201 On the other hand, immigration and immigrant
status play a crucial role in how we legally and politically conceptualize the function of local
governments, the value of local communities, and the purpose of local services. In distributing
limited resources and political power, efforts are often made to maintain a distinction between
immigrants and non-immigrants. From this perspective, immigrants — both legal and
undocumented — are carved out of the local community and reconstituted as a federal ward.
Although the doctrine of federal exclusivity has often been employed to support the former, in
doing so, it has also fueled support for the latter. Indeed, much of our inclination toward seeing
immigrants as a federal population is the result of state and local officials relying on the
distinction between immigrant and native residents to argue that they are disproportionately and
unfairly burdened by immigrants living in their community.
The argument of state and local officials in a series of cases seeking federal reimbursement for
local costs incurred as a result of immigration aptly demonstrates this point. During the mid1990s, state and local officials from New York, New Jersey, Florida, Arizona, California, and
Texas filed nearly identical claims alleging that the federal government’s failure to internalize
the costs associated with immigration at the local level violated, among other things, the
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Naturalization Clause, the Invasion Clause, the Guarantee Clause, and the Tenth Amendment.202
Although these cases were all rejected at the circuit court level (either on the merits or as a nonjudiciable political questions), the arguments in support of these claims provide substantial
insight into the prevalence of this victim model of the immigrant city.
Consider, for example, the case brought by representatives of the state and counties of New
York. Noting that New York absorbs a significant number of legal and illegal immigrants, it
claimed to be “disproportionately affected and . . . burdened by the federal government’s
immigration policy,” and, as such, has become “the victim of an ongoing immigrant
emergency.”203 Indeed, its particular conceptualization of immigrant residents cannot be made
more clear than when the plaintiffs claimed that the “costs associated with providing services to
immigrants” were essentially “costs . . . paid by plaintiffs and the State of New York on behalf of
[the federal government].”204
Indeed, notwithstanding the longstanding responsibility of state and local actors to provide local
services and regulate local economic growth, in all these cases the complaint is that they are
powerless to effectively address the economic problems caused by the “invasion” of legal and
illegal immigrants.205 Why alienage or legal status present insolvable dilemmas that are
fundamentally different from other population influxes, which almost all of these states
experienced throughout the twentieth century, is never explained except with repeated claims
that the immigrant population should properly be understood as a federal population and thus a
federal responsibility.
The fact that none of these claims were given much credit by the judges who heard these cases
does not undermine the prevalence of this attitude among state and local actors today. If the
immigration issue is increasingly becoming a local concern, much of it is due to the fact that
local communities conceive of immigrants as convenient scapegoats upon which to blame their
inability to adequately handle growth or unwillingness to accommodate demographic change,
and the federal government’s perception that their obligation over immigration justifies periodic
and targeted readjustments of that responsibility. The immigrant city is understood to be under
siege by the immigrant masses, and only the federal government is empowered, if it so wishes, to
provide reinforcements. As such, this distinction not only supports, but is also a product of, the
presumption of federal exclusivity that dominates so much of the immigration discussion.
b. Plyler v. Doe. — The victim model of the immigrant city can also be seen in the well known
case of Plyler v. Doe.206 Although usually read as a case about immigrant rights, the manner in
which it was argued before the court reveals how the issue of immigration raises concerns about
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local problems faced by the immigrant population while at the same time conceals the effect that
local government laws have in creating or perpetuating these problems.
In Plyler, the court was asked to decide whether the Equal Protection Clause prevents the State
of Texas from denying undocumented immigrants the right to obtain a free public education in
its local schools. In a divided 5-4 opinion, the Court held that the relative innocence of the
undocumented students and concerns about the creation of a permanent uneducated under-class
counsel in favor of applying heightened scrutiny, which lead it to declare the state statute
unconstitutional.207
As such, Plyler is predominantly read as an immigration decision. It is important to note,
however, that it is also a case about the state’s organization of local governments: not simply
because the named party in this case is a local school district or that the Supreme Court has
recognized that “[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control
over the operation of schools,”208 but also because at the heart of the case is the inequitable
educational funding structure challenged and upheld years earlier in the name of local control in
Rodriguez v. San Antonio School District.209
In order to see this, we need to take note of two points that are usually neglected. First is the
actual statute at issue in this case: Section 21.031 of Texas’s Education Code. Contrary to most
conventional accounts of Plyler, § 21.031 did not directly prohibit undocumented children from
receiving free public education in its schools. The deprivation at issue was precipitated by two
distinct and separate provisions. On the on hand, the Texas statute readjusted how the state
distributes its educational grants by excluding children who were unable to prove their legal
status in the country from its calculation.210 To be sure, school districts that served
undocumented students would be left with less resources overall to educate its student
population. Not unlike the Court’s findings in Rodriguez,211 however, there was nothing to
suggest that any given school district would be rendered incapable of providing an adequate
education to all its children. On the other hand, the Texas statue authorized, but did not
command, local school districts to deny free public education to children who were not a legally
admitted into the United States.212 Of course, the deprivation of state funding for undocumented
students gave struggling local school districts incredible incentive to preclude illegal students
from attending their schools.213 On its face, however, the Texas statute gives local school
districts the final say on whether or not to exclude. In this regard, the statute seems to confirm
Rodriguez’s contention that inequitable distribution of educational funds precipitated by state
law is permissible if, at its heart, it also serves to (however superficially) enhance local control
over education.214
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Second, we should note the state’s use of the local victimization rationale in defense of its
regulation. In defending the rationality of the state’s educational restrictions at the trial court
level, the state employed much of the same evidence about inequitable funding raised by
disadvantaged Hispanic students against the state in Rodriguez. It argued that the poor school
districts, whose fiscal problems were being exacerbated by both legal and illegal immigration
and their special needs, were the ultimate and intended beneficiaries of the state’s educational
reforms.215 Indeed, the state claimed early on that the fiscal health of the state was not the
issue.216 What was at stake, was protecting financially strapped local school districts saddled
with the cost of educating undocumented immigrants by stemming the influx, and empowering
localities to exclude, undocumented students.
Of course, the irony of the state’s position in relation to Rodriguez was not lost upon the district
court: it “note[d] . . . that any spectator watching the state's presentation of evidence might easily
have mistaken it for a retrial of the Rodriguez case, with the State of Texas acting as Amicus
curiae for plaintiffs, emphasizing the plight of the property-poor border school districts under the
state's educational financing scheme.”217 Moreover, it was from the perspective of Rodriguez
that the district court struck down the state statute as unconstitutional under rational basis review.
Noting that the root of the problems identified by the state could be better addressed by changing
the state’s educational funding structure, and was only minimally due to the presence of
undocumented students, the court held that, “excluding illegal immigrant children because of
these problems is both irrational, because the undocumented children as a class are basically
indistinguishable from the legally resident alien children in terms of their needs, and ineffectual,
because the dominant problem remains unsolved.”218
Interestingly, despite these points, the Supreme Court never directly approached the issue in this
case from a local perspective. Why was this the case? First, it could be that the Court
recognized that the decision of local school districts to exclude undocumented students was
essentially a false choice in light of the state’s deprivation of the educational grants, especially
when the state-sanctioned educational funding structure compels most local school districts to
become dependent on state assistance that are constantly subject to change. Alternatively, it
could be that delving too deeply into the relationship between the state and the local government
in the educational context would generate too much tension between Plyler and Rodriguez. As
the dissent noted, it is difficult to reconcile the Court’s belief that the undocumented student’s
“lack of responsibility” for being in the United States in this case counseled in favor of not
penalizing them with regard to education when the same “lack of responsibility” of the plaintiff’s
children in Rodriguez with regard to their residency in property-poor school districts had no
noticeable influence on the Court determination that inequitable funding for public education is
constitutionally permissible.219 Indeed, if the Court had separated the local decision to exclude
and focused entirely on the state’s deprivation of funds, as would have been the case if a local
school district like Edgewood had challenged the state funding structure without exercising the
215
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authority to deny admission to illegal immigrant children altogether,220 the Court may have
found itself uncomfortably bound with increasing irony to defend the state funding structure on
the ground that it preserved local discretion to supplement state funds with local resources.221
Moreover, when Plyler is considered from a local perspective, it raises complicated questions
about the relationship between immigrants and local communities. Recall that the in defending
the political function doctrine, the Court applied a federal conceptualization of alienage as the
baseline for determining the membership of immigrants in all levels of government by stating
that aliens are “by definition” those outside of the political community.222 In this case, however,
when the state sought to defend its regulation on the ground that it was simply establishing a
requirement for municipal residency — the traditional hallmark of municipal membership — the
Court balked at the idea that “illegal entry, without more, prevents a person from becoming a
resident for purposes of enrolling his children in the public schools.”223 Instead, the Court
maintained that the state must adhere to the conventional understanding of municipal residency
— one based on physical residence within a particular locality.224 In contrast to the baseline
presumption that immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, are nonmembers as a result of
federal classifications, the Court found itself inclined here to adopt the opposite baseline
presumption, one that suggests the irrelevance of federal alienage classification in the subnational sphere.
c. Immigrant Dispersal and Refugee Resettlement. — State and local actors have not been the
only ones concerned about cities being too weak to deal with immigration without substantial
federal support. Historically, much of federal immigration policy has been concerned about the
impact of immigration on local communities, especially when such impacts are concentrated in
specific cities or geographic regions.
One of the reasons why the spatial residency of immigrant groups has proved to be crucial site in
the immigration debates is because spatial concentration of immigrants raises the most intense
fears associated with immigration: territorial separatism and demographic balkanization. To be
sure, cultural and ethnic differences presented by immigrant groups have long been considered to
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be sources of discomfort and threat. When this “diversity” is grafted upon demarcated spaces,
however, fear about national disintegration begins to form.225
It is also for this reason that residential mobility in the metropolitan landscape takes on
additional meaning with regard to immigrants. Since Burgess of the Chicago school of urban
sociology linked cultural and social assimilation to the physical and spatial movement of
immigrant groups across the metropolitan landscape,226 residential mobility, and, more often than
not, residential mobility into Anglo suburbs continue to serve as a significant measure of
immigrant assimilation.227
In order to influence the residential decisions of incoming immigrants, federal agencies initially
sought to use immigration restrictions to exclude immigrants that were intended for an
“overcrowded” local labor market. Nevertheless, in Gegiow v. Uhl,228 Justice Holmes, writing
for a unanimous court, rejected this approach. Analyzing the statutory language, the Court held
that the concern is with the personal attributes of the immigrant, and not the local economic or
geographic conditions of any particular place within the United States: “The persons enumerated,
in short, are to be excluded on the ground of permanent personal objections accompanying them
irrespective of local conditions.”229
Without the ability to use the regulatory regime to shape immigrant destinations, federal agencies
turned to other methods. Noting that the “evils” of immigration are caused primarily by the
“congestion of immigrants in the cities,” then-commissioner of immigration Frederick A. Wallis
proposed disbursing information about labor needs in the rural countryside and building stronger
collaborations between state authorities so as to “better distribute[e] . . . aliens, so that both the
country and the immigrants might benefit.”230 For the most part, however, these efforts achieved
limited results.
Our national immigration policy now appears to have largely abandoned any large-scale effort to
control the residential decisions of immigrant in general. Yet similar efforts continue with
respect to the settlement of refugees. Indeed, refugee settlement now involves an “intriguingly
complex system whose centerpiece is a weekly meeting at the Refugee Processing Center in
Arlington, Va.”231 During these meetings, voluntary resettlement agencies, known as “volags,”
who represent local sponsors, allocate refugees in specific local communities around the country.
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Moreover, because of persistent concerns about immigrant concentration and their impact on
local communities, the process generally embraces a policy of dispersal.232
Although the process recognizes the profound local impact in settling refugees, local government
involvement is surprisingly limited. Following the precedent set by the Refugee relief Act of
1953,233 the resettlement program relies primarily on the non-governmental sector to guide local
resettlement efforts and provide initial financial and social support.234 To be sure, federal funds
are often allocated to aid such resettlement efforts. But for the most part federal support is
limited and often they are turned directly over to charitable organizations willing to take on the
responsibility.
At the same time, settlement decisions by volags have profound impacts on the developing of
immigrant communities. In many instances, the planting of these immigrant seed have resulted
in massive secondary migration.235 In addition, the selection process is often shaped by the
inequitable effects of existing local government policies. The decision to settle Somali refugees
in the City of Holyoke, one of the poorest communities in Massachusetts, demonstrates this
point. After initially entering into an agreement with a local religious organization to settle
Somali refugees with federal support, the city council sought to back out back out because it
believed the federal grants were insufficient to counteract its extensive financial problems and
struggling school system.236 Because consent by local governments is not required in the
settlement process, however, the federal government initially refused to reconsider its
decision.237 The irony, however, was that it was precisely because Holyoke was an
impoverished city that it was considered a prime candidate by federal and charitable groups for
this type of settlement. Unlike more prosperous suburbs in the surrounding region, Holyoke had
an ample supply of affordable housing, which, although not conducive to providing substantial
taxable revenue, made it an ideal place to settle poor immigrants.238 As a result, like the case in
Plyler where poor school districts were disproportionately shouldered with the burden of
educating a disproportionate number of immigrant students, local government policies that have
produced vastly different communities end up guiding refugee settlement to some degree as well.
C. The Three Models and its Consequences
The fact that immigration is largely considered a federal issue cannot be entirely understood
without accounting for the latent fears over local involvement in this issue. I have sought to
demonstrate that neither strong federal interests with regard to immigration, nor the questionable
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belief that only the federal government can solve the problems that immigration produces,
completely explains our aversion to looking to the “local” for solutions to our immigration
dilemmas. We seek to disengage local governments from participating in the immigration
project because we feel they are either too powerful (and thus a threat to immigrants or the
nation and the states) or too weak (and therefore vulnerable to immigrant influxes) to assume a
meaningful role.
To be sure, disempowering and depoliticizing the immigrant city in this manner serves to
alleviate the underlying, but often unstated, concerns that we have about local participation with
respect to the issue of immigration. Yet by perpetuating these models, we not only conceal the
valuable and unique role that local government can play in the immigration project, but also how
the legal structure can be changed to realize these benefits. If we can get past the presumption
that immigration is a federal issue, we may begin to realize that local governments are often well
positioned to address a lot of the domestic problems attributed to immigrants while magnifying
the benefits that they provide to this country. If we can get beyond the belief that until they
naturalize, immigrants are a federal population that is by definition outside of all political
communities, then we can begin to realize that potential that local government have for fostering
civic participation and promoting tolerance and immigrant incorporation.
In other words, we need not believe that the current conceptualization of the “local” with respect
to immigration is either desirable or inevitable. If the immigrant city is understood as not only a
geographic place, but also a legal construction, we can begin to imagine ways in which power
and incentives can be changed to enable us to see the potential of looking beyond federal
exclusivity and seeing immigration as a critical local issue as well.
IV. Reimagining the Immigrant City
The preceding Part demonstrates that differing concerns about decentralized power has led to the
development of three competing models of the immigrant city. In each of these models, the city
is presented as a problem; in none do we see it being considered as a possible solution to our
immigration dilemmas. There is, however, nothing inherent in either the structure or the concept
of local governments that make the immigrant city either a threat to immigrants, a threat to the
nation and the states, or a victim of immigration policy. If local government participation in the
immigration project raises the concerns highlighted by these models, it is due in large part to not
only how immigration laws and doctrine structure the relationship between the local and the
federal through immigration law, but also how local government laws allocates power and
incentives to our local political institutions. Realizing this possibility and recognizing the unique
role that local communities can play, we might see a reason to temper or abandon the
unquestioned presumption of federal exclusivity in the immigration context.
It is important to note that in reimagining the immigrant city, the choice is not between federal
exclusivity and unhindered local autonomy. No matter how much we assert the presumption of
federal exclusivity, it is unlikely that federal government will be able to address every issue
affecting immigrants, or that the effect of laws governing local communities will be insolated
from the prospects of our immigration regime. Similarly, it would be shortsighted to simply
empower local communities so that it can be mobilized as another vehicle in the acrimonious

48

Draft: September 4, 2006

conflict over our normative and cultural anxieties over immigration. Such blind empowerment
would likely produce no more than the insular and isolated drifts of local communities toward
opposite extremes that we are beginning to witness today. Indeed, presented with a choice of
these extremes, I believe that most of us will likely dismiss both approaches as either undesirable
or impractical. Thus, instead of distilling the issue down to these two choices, we might be
better off considering how cities should and can be empowered and disempowered in order to
accomplish the substantive goals of the immigrant project — from both the national and local
perspective.
Accordingly, this Part sets out to do two things. Section III.A sets out to reorient the terms of the
debate by proposing a more nuanced approach to understanding the dilemmas that underlie the
models of the immigrant city. On the one hand, it argues that the traditional models of the
immigrant city do not adequately highlight the degree to which successful immigration or local
government programs are contingent upon the operations of the other. On the other hand, it
asserts that although we can benefit from foregrounding the intersection between immigration
and local government law in the manner described above, we must simultaneously be cautious of
over-attributing local problems to the immigrant influx.
Section III.B then outlines a few possibilities of how we can reconceptualize the institutional role
of local governments in an era of immigration as an alternative resource upon which to achieve,
and possibly reframe, the goals of our national immigration policy. I do not intend for this to be
an exhaustive list. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that more cannot be developed once we
accept the possibilities of the local that are available to us.
A. Reorienting the Debate: Clarifying the Intersection between Immigration and Local
Government Law
1. How Immigration Law Influence Local Community Development
First, we should recognize that immigration laws do not just operate to define the national
community; it is also a tool by which we construct our local ones. This is not to say that the
effect of immigration laws on community-building at the local level should be the sole
determinant of how we structure our national immigration policies. It does suggest, however,
that as we move forward in reforming our immigration laws, we should do so with a serious and
considered understanding of its effect on our local communities.
It is important to note that this effect is not limited to the subset of “alienage” regulations that
regulate the lives of immigrants who have already arrived; it extends to even the most basic
immigration questions of all, such as those concerning who, if anyone is permitted to enter our
country.
For example, if our immigration policy continued to emphasize family reunification and binding
financial sponsorship, we would likely see a tendency toward the establishment of immigrant
enclaves by encouraging familial dependence among the immigrant population. At the same
time, allowing immigrants to reunite with family members in American may also promote
immigrants to develop long-term interests in their communities and invest in local communitybuilding efforts accordingly.
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Alternative, if we begin to move our immigration policy toward one that emphasized the
admission of temporary foreign workers to satisfy the immediate low-skilled employment needs
of domestic businesses, like the Bracero program of the early 1900s239 or the guest worker
program currently being debated by Congress,240 we would likely encourage the development of
immigrant cities populated by sojourners with limited social or political ties to the
neighborhoods within which they reside. Of course, from a purely federal perspective, one may
wish to forestall the development of these ties to better ensure that these workers return to their
country of origin at the end of their designated tenure. But even if this is an aim that American
society is willing to embrace, the prospect of building local communities in which an everpresent proportion of residents conceives of themselves, and is treated by others, as a floating
population241 outside of the social and political networks that make communal life possible
should not be dismissed lightly, especially without an honest acknowledgement this impact in
considering such a policy.
Indeed, the more we probe how our immigration policy addresses the question of immigrant
admissions, the more it becomes obvious that the future of our local communities lies in these
national debates. Even today, one can argue that the current system, which has led to the growth
of an underground population and unregulated economy of illegal workers, promotes insular
“protective” enclaves that frustrate broader efforts at local integration. At the same time, local
communities are encouraged by current laws to fixate, wrongly or rightly, on illegal immigrants
as scapegoats for their social or economic troubles without honestly facing up to and addressing
the realities of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity without the specter of illegality dominating the
discussion.
In short, our immigration debates should begin to note that federal immigration policy does not
operate solely at the borders or exclusively on immigrants. We must be attuned to how
immigration policies will affect the type of local communities that we foster in this country. As
long as immigrants live alongside us as fellow residents, the immigration laws that affect their
lives will also have an impact on all those who live within our communities
2. How Local Government Laws Impact Immigration Policy
Similarly, the legal structure of our local government laws affects more than what are normally
considered local affairs; the type of communities that our local government structure promotes
also has significant impact on the success of our immigration policies. Although America has a
long tradition of crafting our immigration policy by looking to the local living conditions of the
existing immigrant population, we must begin to understand that much of this not simply a result
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of the cultural characteristics or socioeconomic status of the immigrants that we formally or
tacitly accept, but is also determined by how local government laws operate on the ground.242
For example, while integration appears to be a major component of our immigration project, we
should realize that it is dictated to a large degree by local government policies that are too often
thought of as outside of the realm of the immigration debate or assumed to be unquestionable
fact of society. In a pluralistic society in which the end-goal of assimilation is always a relative,
shifting, and contentious target, an immigrant’s “fit” will almost always come down to personal
and social connectedness. Thus, the degree to which immigrants are able to interact with and
share in the communal lives of American society as a whole play a substantial role in
determining whether and when newly-arrived immigrants will eventually become a part of the
mainstream.243
But if the local is significant in determining immigrant incorporation into American society, it is
not something that is, or can be solely addressed by our nation’s immigration laws. The local
government structure that promotes certain community organizations over others will have to be
considered as well. For example, if we continue to adhere to legal policies that segregate our
lived environments along lines of race, ethnicity, and class, how can we expect the type of social
and physical connections between immigrants and native residents that would lead to their
eventual integration into mainstream society?244
Moreover, if we wish to promote a culture of racial and ethnic tolerance, then how can we
continue to uphold the norms of white middle-class Americans as the model of assimilation
when their communal existence thus far seems to be premised on racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic homogeneity? Already, there are increasing concerns about racial tensions
between immigrants and native minorities.245 But if communal living, social integration, and
examples of racial and ethnic tolerance are the most promising tools for eroding these
stereotypes, the segregation between blacks and whites so prominently featured by the current
organization of local governments does very little to acculturate our newly-arrived immigrants to
this ideal.246
242

See Mark Ellis, A Tale of Five Cities?: Trends in Immigrant and Native-Born Wages, in Strangers at the Gates,
supra note 3, at 117, 118 (noting that “the literature provides convincing evidence that the ability of immigrants to
make economic gains depends on conditions in the places where they settle, not just on the individual characteristics
they bring with them or acquire while in the United States.”)
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See Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology 739 (1921, 1924) (“The
rapidity and completeness of assimilation depends directly upon the intimacy of social contact.”).
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See id. Indeed, one can see this dilemma in the aftermath of the English Immersion movement that sought to
better integrate students with limited English proficiency by “immersing” them in English-only classrooms. Even if
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internalizing the traditional racial divide in their effort to integrate into American society); cf. Alba & Nee, supra
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Last, if one of the goals of the immigration project is to ensure that today’s immigrants and their
children participate meaningfully in American society instead of being entrenched in the cycle of
poverty and disenfranchisement that afflicts so many of our fellow residents, then how can we
continue to leave unquestioned the local government policies that relegate so many immigrants
and their children to these neighborhoods and imposes so many obstacles in the way of
residential, and thus, social mobility?247 By continuing to allocate vital public services
inequitably according to municipal boundaries, the opportunities and life chances of immigrants
and their children will likely be guided less by what the nation the immigrants are from, and
more by the resources and environment they find once they arrive. Many different forms of
assimilation are possible,248 and whether immigrants assimilate into one as opposed to another
will depend a lot on environmental factors within the United States.249
3. Immigrants as the Miner’s Canary and the Disempowered City
Debates over immigration often bring local issues to the national stage, but, having done so,
frequently distorts these issues by presenting them solely as immigration questions. Thus, in
contemporary political discourse, immigrants often serve as the miner’s canary that propels
problems faced by local communities to national prominence, while, at the same time,
concealing or distorting many of the underlying causes of these problems.
The common complaint that immigration overcrowds and overburdens local schools is a good
example. On the one hand, the immigration influx into cities like Los Angeles appears to have
placed an immense strain on local educational facilities and funding. On the other hand, the
numbers of students that are now being overcrowded into schools in Los Angeles are still a
smaller percentage of the overall population than the record set in the late 1960s before the
modern immigration influx took place.250 Moreover, recent reports show that school districts in
California are now suffering from declining enrollment and the consequent reduction in state
aid.251 To be sure, these finding offer little consolation for children and teachers in overcrowded
note 47, at 45 (describing how early Irish immigrants, who were considered racially inferior and analogized to
African-Americans, “socially distanced themselves from Africa-Americans as a group strategy to gain acceptance
from Anglo-Americans”).
247
See Peter H. Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens 345 (1998) (noting that inner-city residents, who
suffer from prejudice and other disadvantages “can powerfully influence — and contaminate — the values of the
new immigrants’ children” who live in the same communities.)
248
See Min Zhou, Segmented Assimilation : Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the Second Generation,
31 Int’l Migration Rev. 975 (1997) (summarizing and reviewing the segmented assimilation literature).
249
Indeed, many of the social ills we associate with immigration are often not imports from other countries, but
domestic products arising from local conditions. See Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, issue 3, at 98 (2005).
250
A study of Los Angeles Unified School District found that notwithstanding massive waves of immigration into
Los Angeles during the latter part of the twentieth century, it was not until 1996 that student enrollment surpassed
the record-breaking peak set in 1969. Moreover, because the population of Los Angeles grew steadily during this
entire time, the proportion of school children relative to the general population was still less in 1998 (18.7%) than it
was in 1969 (23.2%). Center for the Study of Latino Health & Culture, LAUSD Enrollments, 1966–1998:
Shrinkage, Then Recovery, While the City Grew (2001).
251
Indeed, the current crisis in California’s school system appears to be the adverse effect of declining student
enrollment and its effect on state aid. See Catherine Saillant, Fewer Pupils Create More Worries, L.A. Times, July
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schools. But we should be ready to acknowledge that although immigration may have raised the
prominence of this issue, the root problems may actually lie in how local schools are funded or
their ability to deal with enrollment fluctuations and the negative externalities associated with
neighborhood segregation and concentrated poverty.
This is all not to say that immigrants do not sometimes present unique challenges to local
communities, especially when it comes to English education and language assistance. Indeed,
one of the points of this article is that they do. Nevertheless, many of the pressures that cities
currently face are ones that cities have historically faced with or without immigration. Indeed, in
our effort to curb the excesses of local governments, it appears that we have increasingly
constructed them as political institutions that can do very little to influence their future or adapt
to changing circumstances. The fact that this, and not immigration per se, may be an issue worth
considering is all but concealed by the limited scope of policy debates when immigration is
implicated.
4. Reorienting Localism
Last, we may also need to reorient the ideological foundation of localism itself. Too often, we
take it as a given that the ultimate purpose of local governments is confined to representing the
interests and well-being of its current residents. We should consider how this orientation affects
a local community’s ability or willingness to anticipate and account for the interests of future
residents.
Notwithstanding the widely-held belief that the local is the most stable social and political space
in our lives, almost no community has been able to resist transformations brought about by
shifting patterns of residency and the changing needs that arise as a result.252 Indeed,
irrespective of whether the community is a large established urban center or a developing
residential suburb, it is almost certain that both its population and economic infrastructure will
undergo a tremendous amount of cycling and transformation in any given amount of time.253
As a result, we must recognize that any decision made today to serve the interests of the present
city will ultimately have its most direct and profound effect on a future population.254 With
regard to the immigrant city, this means that steps should be taken to promote a forward-looking
orientation of localism that is not simply concerned about the welfare of existing residents, but
has the foresight and public will to realize that notwithstanding nostalgic ideals usually
associated with the local, local communities of all sorts are inherently spatial nodes of
dynamism, fluidity, and change.
31, 2006, at 1; Joel Rubin, L.A. Unified to Lose Millions From Drop in Enrollment, L.A. Times, June 14, 2006, at
3.
252
See Frug, supra note 45, at 320 – 22, 332.
253
For example, a survey of Los Angeles residents who were over 25 years old found that only 27.5 percent were
born in California; 30.1 percent had migrated from a foreign country and 42.2 percent had migrated from another
state. See Dowell Myers, Demographic Dynamism and Metropolitan Change: Comparing Los Angeles, New York,
Chicago, and Washington, D.C., 10 Housing Policy Debate 919, 934 (1999).
254
Schragger, supra note 56, at 423 (“Future residents of a locality are affected by any number of policies pursued
by current residents, including those policies made in the recent and not-so-recent past by residents who many no
longer live in the jurisdiction but that have adversely affected newer entrants.”).

53

Draft: September 4, 2006

B. Expanding the Scope of the Immigrant City
Having set forth a more nuanced account of the intersection between immigration and local
government law, we can begin to consider how we can restructure the immigrant city to alleviate
the concerns outlined in Part III and expand its role in our immigrant project. Accordingly, this
section proposes some alternative ways of conceptualizing the immigrant city to address these
concerns. I argue that (1) instead of construing immigrants as a federal ward and relying on
“virtual representation” at the federal level for their protection, we can more effectively achieve
the same ends by severing the relationship between national and local membership and folding
immigrants into the local polity, (2) we can address the fear of local governments being easily
co-opted by immigrant interest by exploring ways in which local, immigrant, and national
interests converge and the role that local governments can play in furthering these joint
objectives, and (3) instead of fixating on the financial and social costs of immigration on local
communities, local governments can act to promote the potential benefits that immigrant
residents can bring.
No doubt that while some cities would benefit by adopting all, some, or a combination of these
proposals, others will likely seek alternatives not set forth below. The benefit of political
decentralization, however, is that with the proper institutional structure, communities can
collective reach their own decisions on how to solve their problems and hopefully, in the
process, generate stronger civic ties between its residents. We may not know exactly what legal
shape an immigrant city would need to take in order to better serve national and local interests
with respect to immigration. But we can and should begin the process of orienting the debate in
such a manner so as to allow for such reform to take place.
1. Addressing the Immigrant City as a Threat to Immigrants: Severing the
Relationship between National and Local Membership
Normative and legal principles of equal protection and immigrant rights have gone a long way in
protecting immigrant residents from the sometimes oppressive inclinations of local governments.
But a more long-term and effective way to address our fears about immigrant cities being a threat
to immigrants might require us to adopt broader institutional reforms at the local level that folds
immigrant residents into the local political community irrespective of national citizenship. In
addition, as Bainer Baubock explains, “[n]ew forms of urban citizenship might promote a
cosmopolitan transformation of national conceptions of membership from below and from
within.”255 Thus, broader efforts should be made to sever the connection between national and
local membership generally, and permit noncitizen immigrants the ability to vote and participate
in local elections specifically.256
On the one hand, fostering such a conceptualization of local membership serves pragmatic
functions with respect to the effective and efficient operations of local governance. Already, the
255

Rainer Baubock, Reinventing Urban Citizenship, 7 Citizenship Studies 139, 142 (2003).
To be sure, alien suffrage, especially at the local level, is not a unique or novel proposition. See Gerald
Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Laws 64 – 66 (1996); Raskin,
supra note 116, at 1403 (“Although aliens . . . voted feely in state, federal and territorial elections in many places,
their participation in local government was even more common.”).
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concentration of immigrant noncitizens in many communities is beginning to approach numbers
that just cannot be ignored.257 As the franchise is the primary mechanism by which the interests
and needs of municipal residents are conveyed to local leaders, and, in turn, channeled to state
and federal authorities, ignoring the political concerns of noncitizen immigrants at the local level
does a disservices to the effectiveness of representative democracy.
On the other hand, local citizenship manifested through local franchises also serve an important
symbolic function: “immigrants . . . would be made aware that they are now full members of the
polity and are also expected to use their rights of participation; the native population would be
made aware that they share a common membership in the city with the immigrant population;
and the city would formally assert its distinct character as a local polity vis-à-vis the national
government.” That such an effect may be labeled as symbolic does not mean that it is
insignificant. Local citizenship could serve as a fertile ground for training immigrants to become
future citizens by participating in local politics and, in doing so, bolstering their civic identity
and loyalty to America’s democratic foundations. Because “the process of becoming a citizen
[in the United States] emphasizes a (necessary) legal formalism, [and] not socialization into the
means and meanings of active citizenry in a democratic society,”258 experience with the
democratic process in this manner could be an invaluable civic education tool. Immigrant
participation could also temper exclusionary tendencies at the local level by channeling concerns
from both sides into the public realm.
But why should we believe that adopting a broader conceptualization of local citizenship would
necessarily protect immigrants much more effectively than federal efforts? First, history has
shown that local political power has done more to protect immigrants from oppression and
promote their involvement in American politics than protections instituted at the federal level. It
is no coincidence that the vast majority of the cases in which the courts have stepped in to protect
immigrants either occurred before a particular immigrant population was able to gain a
significant foothold in local politics (the European immigrants in New York and Boston), or
because federal restrictions on naturalization and the convergence of national and local
citizenship prevented other groups from participating in the local political process at all (the
Chinese and the Japanese on the West Coast). Moreover, local political participation promotes
assimilation of immigrant groups in ways that assimilation mandates do not. Public sector jobs
have historically allowed many immigrant (and minority) groups to secure a solid economic
foothold in American society.259 Moreover, experience with politics at the local level has also
given many immigrant groups a conveyer belt to higher levels of government.260
257
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Second, it is not clear that immigrants’ “virtual representation” at the federal level through the
foreign affairs establishment accurately reflects their interests.261 On the one hand, such
representation will likely offer very little protection for immigrants whose country-of-origin is
not on good terms with America. Indeed, with regard to immigrants from countries in the
middle-east, the foreign affairs establishment has probably has done more to marginalize these
groups than protect them. On the other hand, the interests that foreign nations voice in
Washington will likely diverge to some degree from those of the immigrants themselves. 262
Because immigration provides important economic benefits to sending countries, those countries
may tolerate or even promote certain exclusionary activities in order to ensure that immigrants
maintain loyalties to their country-of-origin or encourage their eventual return.263
In short, with the proper institutional reforms, local communities may serve as a better “direct”
representative of immigrant interests than the nation as a whole. Moreover, the decentralization
of local governments ensures that the diversity of immigrant groups and local community needs
are properly reflected.
2. Addressing the Immigrant City as a Threat to the Nation or the States:
Reconsidering National Interests and Finding a Local Role
Severing national and local membership may temper the inclination of local governments to
discriminate against its immigrant residents, but it also exacerbates fears of immigrant cities
becoming political bastions of immigrant power. But we need not believe that local involvement
in the immigration project always poses a threat to national objectives.
On the one hand, it is possible that when federal interests are considered from a local
perspective, we will reach a different consensus on what kind of federal interests we wish
promote. Consider the increasing appeal of skill- or need-based immigration tied to labor sectors
or employers that have particular needs that are unmet by the native labor force.264 In the
national forum, where business and industry lobbies have the loudest voice, such a policy
appears to be the best way to promote American interests. From a local perspective, however, it
is not clear that the economic benefits of immigration lie solely in filling the gaps in existing
industries. Historically, immigration has also led to the creation and proliferation of
unanticipated industries and services that reinvigorate local economies, and in the aggregate,
provide substantial contributions to the national economy and expand our global economic reach.
261

See Neuman, supra note 93, at 1436–37.
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Thus, expanding the scope with which we ordinarily use to judge immigration to include local
developments on the ground may influence how we define what kind of immigration is in fact in
the best interests of this nation.
On the other hand, local participation in the immigration project could transform elusive federal
interests into tangible objectives. In other words, political decentralization need not be
something that we fear with regard to immigration. Structured in the correct manner, it can have
a profound impact in filling in many of the gaps that centralized, federal regulations have not
adequately addressed.
For example, although most would agree that immigrant assimilation is just as important of a
federal interest as immigration enforcement, very few policies have been crafted to serve the
former. Nevertheless, local governments can be an important tool in this regard. First,
recognizing the immigrant city as a partner in the immigration project could counsel in favor of
giving certain local communities more power and incentives to structure their land-use and
housing policies to account for their role as immigrant receiving centers. Cities can be
empowered to either acquire property to build affordable housing options tailored to the needs of
newly-arrived immigrants,265 or encourage the development of the same through inclusive
zoning regulations. In order to accommodate many of the lone sojourners that come to work,
cities could develop or promote smaller housing units with communal shared spaces. Similarly,
to meet the needs of extended families of immigrants who band together for social and financial
support, cities may wish to promote living facilities that provide more segmented living quarters
and amenities for multi-generational residency.266 Indeed, depending on present needs,
anticipated demands, or other normative consideration, a local community can vary this efforts in
a number of ways: housing can built specifically for immigrants or provided for a diverse range
of municipal residents; they can be provided as permanent dwellings for several years or as
temporary housing units aimed at accommodating recently-arrived immigrants for a short period
of time; and they could be organized to be self-sustaining or could be offered as a subsidized
service in hopes of offsetting social service costs down the road that affordable housing in the
early years might alleviate.
Second, just as municipal-supported affordable housing can be used to help immigrants settle in
America by providing residential options that meet their specific needs, cities may also wish to
develop dedicated welcoming centers to help immigrant learn and adjust to American society.
During the first wave of immigration to the United States, receiving centers such as New York’s
Castle Gardens and its federal successor, Ellis Island, served as facilities where immigrants were
not only inspected, but also provided with a wealth of information and services to facilitate their
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settlement.267 Although for the vast majority of immigrants today the journey to American no
longer involves sailing past the Statute of Liberty and into New York harbor, many distinct cities
still serve as important points of entry for newly-arrived immigrants. Cities in these positions
could therefore (re)establish formal receiving centers to assist in local resettlement efforts:
immigrants can receive information about available job prospects, learn how to apply for driver’s
licenses and other registrations, be provided with assistance regarding naturalization and their
legal rights in this country,268 find out about housing and transportation options, or even enroll in
English language or job training course. To be sure, some cities and non-profit organizations
have already taken the initiative to offer some of these services. A centralized location, however,
can effectively provide a number of immigrant-related services from several different
governmental and non-profit organizations while encouraging these organizations to cooperate in
more efficient ways to streamline their operations.
Providing welcoming facilities or similar services at the local level could also be used to better
disperse the immigrant population into different parts of the country. While many popular
immigrant destinations complain about the disproportionate burden they shoulder with regard to
immigrant needs, others, such as the cities of Baltimore, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, and Louisville
have started to look into actively recruiting immigrants into their community.269 Considering the
large numbers of immigrants already arriving into established gateway communities,
collaborating with municipal receiving centers in these areas to provide information about and
advertise specific resettlement programs offered by these recruiting communities may actually be
a more effective and efficient means of attracting immigrants. Informal information exchanges
among co-ethnic networks already play a large part in guiding residential decisions among
immigrant populations — sometimes leading to massive resettlement.270 Formalizing the
process through a collaborative inter-local effort would better channel such movements to serve
the interests of immigrants and communities across the country. To be sure, local governments
in traditional gateway cities may be concerned about expending valuable local resources to train,
educate, and assimilate immigrants that will eventually leave for other communities.271 There is
no reason to believe, however, that implementing a successful local settlement program
combined with an active national resettlement effort would not lead to greater cross regional
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cooperation among various communities across the country that would also produce additional
means of financing these programs.272
These two proposals offer some immediate possibilities that can be effectuated largely within the
current structure of local government laws. But if the federal government is serious about its
effort to integrate immigrants into American society and ensure that they, along with their
children, make long-lasting contributions to our nation, then the immigration debates must also
be attuned to how the existing structure of local government laws organize our local
communities. As I explained above, existing local government policies have a tremendous
impact on our country’s ability to bring immigrants into the fold of mainstream America and
promote acceptance and tolerance of their presence. The fully benefits of immigration will never
be truly realized if federal, state, and local governments do not take steps to dismantle the
inequitable and segregated communities that plague our metropolitan regions. In this and many
other respects, local government law is not just a local issue — it should be considered a national
one as well.
Of course, neither a strong commitment to community building, nor any of the proposals
outlined above, will guarantee the disintegration of immigrant enclaves or complete and total
dissolution of recent immigrants and their children into “mainstream” (i.e. middle-class Anglo)
American society. But ultimately, this may not be something that we want. We should certainly
take steps to dismantle the legal and social forces that artificially limit the residential options of
immigrant families along the lines of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, or alienage. But we
need not believe that replacing one form of uniformity (e.g. white suburbs, ethnic inner-cities)
with another (perfect demographic distribution across the entire region) is the best possible
outcome.273 What makes city-life, if not life in American society as a whole, interesting and
exciting is the fact that there are physical spaces in which neighborhoods of character can arise.
Moreover, without artificial legal impediments to residential mobility or the building of a
cohesive political community, we would likely see more people of all walks of life being able to
live in and enjoy these distinct communities instead of feeling that eradicating them would be the
only way to prevent widespread balkanization and ethnic separatism.
3. Addressing the Immigrant City as a Victim of Immigration: Facilitating Local
Development and Promoting Global Competitiveness
Last, local communities need not refrain from being actively involved in the broader immigration
project because they believe themselves to be the ultimate victim of immigration and
immigration policy generally. Instead of focusing on accounting techniques that discount the
benefits of immigration and construes local services as private commodities that are “purchased”
by immigrants through their tax contributions, steps should be taken to address the local funding
272
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system as a whole. Indeed, we should acknowledge that the beneficiaries of these services as not
limited to the immigrant who receive them: proactive and preventative medical assistance to
immigrants or their children has health and fiscal benefits for the entire community as a whole,
and funding education for first and second generation immigrants, as opposed to being a windfall
for their parents, are the means by which we determine how much they will be able to contribute
to American society in the future.
Similarly, local communities need not be paralyzed by the demographic challenges brought
about by immigration, especially when local governments can take affirmative steps to promote
positive developments. This effort can be largely local in scope. For example, cities could work
with immigrant entrepreneurs to encourage businesses in distressed neighborhoods. This would
help many immigrants to achieve an economic foothold in American society while channeling
the positive effects of immigration to neighborhoods that are in need of economic revitalization.
Local communities can also promote immigrant entrepreneurship by providing training, financial
services, and other incentives. This could be a good alternative to the raze-and-reconstruct
techniques employed in urban renewal movement of the mid-1990s by providing for necessary
redevelopment while also promoting communities of character that may become a strong cultural
asset for the city. Vibrant commercial and residential neighborhoods not only reduce many of
the ills associated with economic and social isolation, but it also cultivates a culture of
investment by local residents and business owners.
Local governments can also formulate ways to regulate or formalize labor markets in which
immigrants are disproportionately represented to ensure that employers comply with labor and
wage requirements and minimize any effect that immigrant labor may have on the wages of other
disadvantaged groups. For instance, local communities may be encouraged to either
independently, or with the assistance of private or charitable groups,274 establish formal hiring
centers for day-laborers.275 Day-laborer hiring centers would not only alleviate local opposition
to immigrant workers by reducing their presence on street corners and other public and semipublic locations, such centers can also establish efficient and uniform requirements regarding
how workers are assigned, minimum wages for different types of tasks, and working conditions
at job sites. In a largely non-unionized sector of the job market, day-laborer centers can facilitate
the type of collective action necessary to keep wages from plummeting and ensure safe working
conditions. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that day-laborer centers would serve to only
help the immigrant population in a given community. Regulated centers could also provide
another form of employment for low-skilled native workers who have difficulties finding fulltime employment. A formalized structure for dispersing such work could reduce employer
reliance on co-ethnic referrals and give opportunities to other local residents as well.
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At the same time, embracing the benefits of immigration may require immigrant cities to adopt a
more transnational outlook. As America becomes increasingly entrenched in a globalized
network of economic, political, and cultural relationships, the immigrant city is also extending
outwards: it is progressively being thought of as vital nodes of connection between the United
States and the world. Indeed, if the focus of the first two alternatives of the immigrant city
emphasizes its capacity of the local to serve as a representative of the nation in bringing
immigrants into America’s social, economic, and cultural mainstream, in a world of increased
transnational connectivity, might we also see the immigrant city as a representative of the United
States to the world, with the immigrant acting as a vital link in the process.
If certain cities may wish to develop in the direction of being a global city, how could the legal
presumptions about the goals of our immigration project or the role that local government play
be altered to accommodate these interests? For one, it may be necessary to further decentralize
power over immigrant education to local authorities. Cities seeking to become world or global
cities may have educational priorities different from that of the state or the nation for their
immigrant and native residents. Indeed, notwithstanding the national and state trends favoring
rapid and uniform linguistic assimilation through policies designed to enshrine English as the
“official” language, aspiring global cities like the City of Miami are already deviating somewhat
by upholding the Spanish proficiency of its immigrant population in support of claim as the
“Gateway to Latin America.”276 Instead of fostering state or national English Only initiatives
that threaten to foreclose local discretion with regard to local language education, cities like
Miami should be given the leeway to adopt educational programs that promote true bilingualism
— not only for the second and third generation Hispanic immigrants, but also native-born whites
and blacks as well — to better prepare its residents to participate in Miami’s unique economic
climate.277
A shift toward seeing immigrant cities as embedded in the transnational marketplace may also
spur cities to participate more fully in the development of local economic policies with an eye to
reducing local inequalities. The economic expansion based on manufacturing and other
unionized labor during the early to mid-twentieth century is believed to have helped create a
sizable middle-class. But, at the same time, it also led to the suburban exodus of many
metropolitan residents at the expense of the inner-city. The new urban economy has propelled
many residents and businesses to relocate back into the central cities. But its emphasis on
financial services and high-technology has lead to increased socioeconomic inequalities and a
deepening divide between the rich and the working poor.278 To be sure, local governments
would likely tread lightly with regard to local inequalities lest they lose their competitive edge to
competing cities in America and around the world. Nevertheless, as a political institution with
jurisdiction over these vital nodes of global trade, local governments in global cities are also in a
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good position to channel much of the surplus capital generated within its jurisdiction toward
progressive programs aimed at raising the standard of living for all its residents.279
In the end, it may be that the increasing interdependence and interrelationship between global
cities across the world could counsel in favor of devolving some control over immigration
inflows from the federal government down to the local level altogether. As cities are beginning
to play a larger role in the global marketplace, they are already beginning to take informal
stances on issues relating to immigration and foreign affairs, including strengthening their
independent relationship with cities across the world.280 It is possible to imagine a time when it
may be deemed appropriate to exempt cities from the national monopoly on issues such as
immigration altogether. There is no reason to believe that the interests of global cities will
always or necessarily coincide with those of the nation as a whole. Moreover, as Baubock
argues, such liberation may be especially beneficial to cities that are already linked with
transnational counterparts in other countries: “Instead of being confined within sovereign states
where they merely form the smallest self-governing territorial units, city polities would in this
way be connected to each other in transnational relations.”281 Of course, I offer this last proposal
tentatively; it certainly introduces a lot of complications — from broad normative concerns about
national unity to pragmatic considerations such as how to control the inflows of immigrant into
one community from moving to other communities that seeks to restrict immigration — at the
same time that it promises a more flexible system of immigration that takes into account local
needs and interests.
Conclusion
The fate of American society is too intricately tied to the health and vitality of our cities for us to
continue to disregard the role of local governments in this nation’s immigration project. The
intersection between immigration and local government law is too entrenched in the doctrinal
framework for us to continue to ignore the mutual impact of these two bodies of law upon one
another. As this article has demonstrated, the current state of the immigrant city simply cannot
be dismissed as an inevitable consequence of social and economic forces outside of our control.
Nor should we persist in writing off the legal space within which it stands — at the legal juncture
of immigration and local government law — as an unintended doctrinal anomaly. As a
significant geo-social institution in our lives and a vital ideological component of our national
narrative, we must begin to understand and study the immigrant city as a legal concept. We can
maintain the immigrant city as it stands now by continuing the legal foundation upon which it
rests. But as a product of our legal structure, we are also free to transform it to serve different
purposes and, ultimately, to pursue different normative objectives. The immigrant city can be a
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valuable tool in the national immigration project, if only we are willing to accept it as such and
legally shape it to advance certain normative goals as opposed to others.
It is admittedly far too early to predict exactly what shape an alternative model of the immigrant
city might take or what solutions or problems such an alternative model might bring. What is
becoming more evident, however, is that the current models of the immigrant city are too
limited, even in their varied forms, to serve the national immigration interests or the local
interests with regard to immigrant incorporation into our local communities. We should
certainly proceed with caution in exploring ways to reform the existing legal structure as it
pertains to the role of local governments in the immigration debates. But lest we lose sight of the
fact that the current models of the immigrant city have hardly arisen through conscious
deliberation, we should seize this opportunity to explore the myriad possibilities that the
immigrant city might hold.
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